Analyzing the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of The Holly Act

by Joanna Swaiss, Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 94

I. Introduction

In recent years, a series of highly publicized incidents involving group violence and disorder in Cincinnati has intensified concerns about public safety. In July 2025, a widely circulated video of a violent downtown brawl prompted scrutiny of the pretrial detention system and how the criminal justice system responds to violent crimes.¹ The incident caught the attention of Vice President J.D. Vance, who has ties to Cincinnati.² He described the brawl as proof of “lawlessness” in American cities.³

In response to the incident, Ohio legislators introduced the Holly Act, named after a victim of the brawl.⁴ The bill aims to tighten bail requirements and restrict pretrial release for individuals charged with violent offenses, a move arguably justified given that one of Holly’s accused attackers was released on bail just two weeks before the assault.⁵

These developments reflect a growing perception that existing pretrial release practices fail to adequately protect public safety. Proponents of reform argue that individuals charged with violent offenses are too readily released, enabling repeat misconduct and undermining deterrence.⁶ However, any attempt at bail reform must comply with the requirement of individualized determinations and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive bail.⁷ The tension between these competing concerns—public safety and constitutional rights—has placed renewed pressure on legislatures to reform pretrial frameworks without sacrificing the fundamental rights of criminal defendants.

This article argues that the Holly Act is both overinclusive and underinclusive: overinclusive in its potential to detain individuals who pose minimal risk, and underinclusive in its failure to identify and manage those who present a genuine threat to public safety. Part II provides background on Ohio’s bail framework, relevant constitutional principles, the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS), and the legislative development of the Holly Act. Part III critiques the limitations of reactive, offense-based bail restrictions and examines empirical research on pretrial detention and recidivism. Part IV argues that, rather than adopting categorical restrictions like those in the Holly Act, Ohio should strengthen and more consistently apply individualized, risk-based pretrial decision-making by enhancing judicial oversight, limiting overreliance on monetary bail, and improving the use of existing assessment tools.

II. Background

This Part situates the debate over pretrial release and bail reform within its broader constitutional, statutory, and factual context. It outlines the constitutional guidelines for pretrial release established by the United States Supreme Court. It then turns to Ohio’s pretrial framework, including the role of statutory factors and risk assessment tools, highlighting both their intended function and the criticisms of wealth-based detention that persist in practice. Against this legal backdrop, the Part examines the viral downtown brawl and the criminal histories of those involved, an incident that catalyzed public concern over repeat offenders and pretrial release. Finally, it introduces the Holly Act as a legislative response to these concerns.

A. The Constitutional Foundations of Bail and Pretrial Release

The modern law of pretrial release is grounded in both federal and state constitutional principles.⁸ It seeks to balance the presumption of innocence with the government’s interest in ensuring public safety and a defendant’s appearance at trial.⁹ The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.”¹⁰ In Stack v. Boyle, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that bail must be individualized and based on standards relevant to the defendant’s likelihood of appearing in court.¹¹ The Court rejected uniform bail practices that failed to account for individual circumstances, emphasizing that pretrial detention cannot be imposed arbitrarily.¹²

At the same time, the Court has recognized that pretrial detention may serve legitimate purposes, such as reducing flight risk and protecting public safety.¹³ For example, in U.S. v. Salerno, the Court upheld the preventive detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, finding that detention based on future danger does not violate due process when accompanied by robust procedural safeguards.¹⁴ The Court noted several safeguards while determining the Act’s constitutionality, including the arrestee’s right to counsel and cross-examination, as well as the right to testify and present witnesses.¹⁵ It further noted that:

If the judicial officer finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community, he must state his findings of fact in writing, § 3142(i), and support his conclusion with “clear and convincing evidence[.]” § 3142(f). The judicial officer is not given unbridled discretion in making the detention determination. Congress has specified the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors include the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the Government’s evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee’s background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect’s release. § 3142(g). Should a judicial officer order detention, the detainee is entitled to expedited appellate review of the detention order. §§ 3145(b), (c).¹⁶

Together, these cases—Stack and Salerno—establish two core principles: bail determinations must be individualized, and preventive detention is permissible only within carefully circumscribed procedural bounds.

B. Ohio’s Statutory and Procedural Framework

Ohio’s pretrial release system is governed by a combination of statutes, court rules, and local practices. The Ohio Constitution prohibits excessive bail, and an Ohio statute requires that courts consider the nature of the offense, characteristics of the accused, and other pertinent factors in determining pretrial release.¹⁷  In practice, many jurisdictions supplement these considerations with ORAS, including its pretrial assessment tool, which provides a structured method for evaluating a defendant’s risk of nonappearance and new criminal activity.¹⁸

Developed by the University of Cincinnati, ORAS is intended to promote consistency and objectivity in bail determinations by incorporating empirically validated risk factors into the decision-making process.¹⁹ Judges may use these assessments alongside statutory factors to inform release conditions, although the weight afforded to ORAS scores may vary across jurisdictions.²⁰ Judges are authorized to impose a range of conditions on pretrial release, including personal recognizance bonds, cash or surety bail, and non-monetary conditions (e.g., electronic monitoring or no-contact orders).²¹ In theory, this system allows courts to tailor release conditions to the specific risks that each defendant poses.

However, in practice, Ohio’s bail system has faced persistent criticism for its overreliance on monetary bail.²² Defendants with financial means are often able to secure release, while indigent defendants may remain detained for low-level offenses. This dynamic has raised concerns about wealth-based detention and unequal treatment.²³ Ohio lawmakers and legal stakeholders have debated broader bail reforms, including efforts to move away from wealth-based detention, but recent actions have focused on maintaining existing procedures.²⁴ Ohio’s existing bail practices were thrust into the national spotlight after the viral downtown brawl.²⁵

C. Events of July 26, 2025

The incident occurred at approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 26, 2025, at the intersection of Fourth and Elm Streets, near the nightclub LoVe on Fourth.²⁶ While it is unclear what led to the brawl, alcohol consumption, large crowds, and the bystander effect likely contributed to the incident.²⁷ Among the accused are Patrick Rosemond, Gregory Wright, Montianez Merriweather, and Dominique Kittle.²⁸

Rosemond has thirteen prior criminal convictions, including three felonies.²⁹ Wright has twenty-two prior arrests and two prior felony convictions, one for trafficking heroin and one for possessing a firearm as a prohibited person.³⁰ Merriweather also has prior felony convictions and was charged with illegally possessing a firearm as a felon, “stemming from a July 2 incident.”³¹ Kittle was found not guilty by reason of insanity on previous criminal charges.³²

Most notably, one of the accused attackers was released on bail a mere two weeks before the brawl, though media reports do not specify which defendant.³³ This event fueled the perception that existing bail practices inadequately address public safety and repeat offenders—inspiring the Holly Act.³⁴

D. The Holly Act

WLWT described how the Holly Act aims to combat violence in Ohio:

[The Act] seeks to stop situations like [the brawl] by increasing penalties for failing to appear in court for individuals who have ignored two or more summonses in the last five years…bonds would increase from 10 to 25 percent, and [such defendants] would no longer be released on their own recognizance. The bill also prohibits nonprofit organizations from posting bail for serious and violent crimes and caps charitable bail at $5,000.³⁵

The Holly Act represents a legislative response to public pressure for stronger deterrence and accountability in the aftermath of high-profile incidents. By focusing on offense categories and prior conduct, the bill seeks to ensure that dangerous individuals are less likely to be released pending trial.³⁶ However, this approach raises significant legal and practical questions.

III. Discussion

The Holly Act reflects a familiar legislative pattern: a highly publicized incident catalyzes a swift policy response aimed at preventing similar harm in the future. While such responses are politically compelling, they often risk sacrificing empirical effectiveness in favor of immediacy. This Part argues that the Holly Act, though grounded in legitimate public safety concerns, raises constitutional concerns and functionally misaligns with the realities of pretrial risk. Specifically, the Holly Act is both overinclusive and underinclusive, and it risks reintroducing wealth-based detention in a manner inconsistent with modern bail reform.

A. Constitutional Concerns: Individualization and Excessiveness

At its core, the Holly Act raises serious questions under the constitutional requirement that bail determinations be individualized. As emphasized in Stack, bail cannot be imposed according to rigid categories that fail to account for the defendant’s specific circumstances.³⁷ When assessing risk, courts have long considered both the offense’s severity and the defendant’s history of compliance with orders to appear.³⁸ However, the Holly Act elevates these factors from considerations within an individualized analysis to near-determinative triggers, thereby reducing judicial flexibility to weigh countervailing circumstances.³⁹ In doing so, it risks converting relevant factors into rigid rules, rather than components of a holistic assessment.

Although the Supreme Court in Salerno upheld preventive detention, it did so only because the statutory framework at hand included robust procedural safeguards, and it narrowly targeted individuals deemed dangerous based on clear and convincing evidence.⁴⁰ By contrast, the Holly Act relies more heavily on proxies—such as prior missed court appearances or offense labels—rather than individualized findings of dangerousness supported by evidentiary hearings.⁴¹ To the extent that these proxies operate as de facto detention triggers, they may fall short of the procedural rigor required under Salerno.⁴²

Additionally, the Holly Act raises concerns about the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive bail. Increasing bond percentages from 10 to 25 percent for certain defendants, without a corresponding inquiry into ability to pay, risks imposing financial conditions that, in practice, function as detention orders.⁴³ Bail set beyond a defendant’s means may be constitutionally excessive, particularly where less restrictive alternatives could reasonably ensure appearance and public safety.⁴⁴ By tying release to financial capacity rather than risk, the Holly Act may perpetuate the very inequities that recent bail reform efforts have sought to address.

B. Overinclusiveness: Sweeping in Low-Risk Defendants

One of the Holly Act’s central flaws is its overinclusive design. Its focus on nonappearance captures a broad range of defendants who may not pose a meaningful risk to public safety. To be clear, failures to appear are a legitimate and serious concern, and courts are justified in treating repeated noncompliance as evidence of unreliability. However, not all failures to appear necessarily carry the same implications for public safety or future compliance. For example, individuals who have missed court dates due to logistical barriers, such as a lack of transportation or unstable housing, may be subject to heightened bail requirements despite presenting minimal danger to the community. The Holly Act does not distinguish between willful evasion and nonappearance stemming from instability or disorganization. A more tailored approach would preserve accountability while allowing courts to differentiate between defendants who deliberately avoid proceedings and those whose past noncompliance is less predictive of future dangerousness.

Empirical research on pretrial detention supports this concern. Studies consistently show that defendants who are detained pretrial are more likely to experience adverse outcomes, including job loss, housing instability, and a higher likelihood of future criminal conduct.⁴⁵ While some of these effects may reflect underlying differences between detained and released individuals, findings from the American Economic Association suggest that pretrial detention itself can contribute to these outcomes:

[Using] the detention tendencies of quasi-randomly assigned bail judges to estimate the causal effects of pretrial detention on subsequent defendant outcomes…we find that pretrial detention significantly increases the probability of conviction, primarily through an increase in guilty pleas. Pretrial detention has no net effect on future crime, but decreases formal sector employment and the receipt of employment- and tax-related government benefits. These results are consistent with (i) pretrial detention weakening defendants’ bargaining positions during plea negotiations and (ii) a criminal conviction lowering defendants’ prospects in the formal labor market.⁴⁶

These consequences not only undermine individual rights, but may also exacerbate the very public safety concerns that the Holly Act seeks to address.

Moreover, the Holly Act’s restrictions on charitable bail funds and limitations on release for certain violent offenses are grounded in a legitimate premise: more serious charges often correlate with greater potential danger to the community. Therefore, courts are justified in treating the severity of the offense as an important factor in pretrial determinations. However, the Holly Act effectively elevates offense classification from a relevant consideration to a controlling one, limiting courts’ ability to distinguish between defendants who present materially different risk levels.

In practice, this structure increases reliance on financial conditions in cases that already carry high bail, leaving defendants without financial resources with fewer avenues for release, even when individualized factors suggest that less restrictive conditions could reasonably ensure public safety. The Holly Act thus risks overrelying on offense severity, reducing precision, and amplifying the role of financial means in pretrial outcomes.

C. Underinclusiveness: Failing to Identify True Risk

Paradoxically, the Holly Act is also underinclusive. While it expands restrictions on broad categories of defendants, it is unlikely to improve the system’s ability to identify and manage individuals who pose a genuine threat to public safety. The Act relies heavily on static factors rather than dynamic, evidence-based assessments of current risk.⁴⁷

The severity of the assault on July 26, 2025, understandably raised questions about whether the pretrial system failed to prevent a foreseeable harm.⁴⁸ When an individual released on bail is later accused of committing a violent offense, it is reasonable to scrutinize the prior release decision. However, a single outcome, while tragic, does not on its own establish that the governing legal framework is systematically deficient. The relevant inquiry is whether existing procedures adequately forecast risk, not whether they can eliminate all instances of subsequent criminal conduct. Without a structured framework for assessing dangerousness at the time of release, it is difficult to conclude that stricter categorical rules would have prevented the incident. A system that relies on individualized, data-informed assessments may be better equipped to identify high-risk individuals than one that imposes blanket restrictions.

Furthermore, the Holly Act does not meaningfully enhance judicial tools for supervision or intervention short of detention. Non-monetary conditions—such as electronic monitoring, curfews, or targeted supervision—are largely absent from the statute’s framework.⁴⁹ This omission limits the Holly Act’s effectiveness as a public safety measure.

D. The Problem with Reactive Legislation

The Holly Act’s shortcomings reflect a broader issue in criminal justice policymaking: the tendency to enact reactive legislation in response to high-profile events. Public concern about safety in downtown Cincinnati is real and significant, and perceptions play a legitimate role in shaping policy priorities. At the same time, durable legal reform requires distinguishing between acute, high-profile incidents and broader systemic patterns. Legislation grounded primarily in the former risks overcorrecting in ways that may not improve long-term public safety outcomes. Therefore, policies crafted in their wake may be ill-suited to address underlying structural issues.

In the context of bail reform, reactive legislation often prioritizes visibility over efficacy. Increasing bond amounts or restricting release may create the appearance of decisive action. However, these measures do not necessarily reduce crime or recidivism.⁵⁰ In fact, by disrupting employment, housing, and community ties, pretrial detention can increase the likelihood of future criminal behavior.⁵¹ Thus, policies that expand detention without improving risk assessment may ultimately prove counterproductive. By focusing on a single, highly visible incident, the Holly Act risks overcorrecting in ways that undermine long-term public safety goals.

The Holly Act, while well-intentioned, fails to strike an appropriate balance between public safety and constitutional safeguards. Its reliance on categorical restrictions and financial conditions renders it both constitutionally suspect and practically ineffective. These limitations suggest the need for a more coherent approach to pretrial reform—one that aligns with our Constitution and incorporates empirical evidence.

IV. Conclusion

Communities have a right to expect safety, and policymakers are justified in seeking reforms that reduce violence and recidivism. But durable and effective reform must be grounded in more than urgency. It must also reflect our Constitution, empirical evidence, and a clear understanding of the limits of pretrial detention as a tool of crime control.

Accordingly, rather than adopting categorical restrictions, like those embodied in the Holly Act, Ohio should focus on strengthening individualized, risk-based decision-making within its existing framework. This includes reinforcing judicial discretion, limiting overreliance on financial conditions, and ensuring that pretrial determinations are guided by evidence rather than assumption. In the end, the challenge is not simply to respond to high-profile incidents, but to build a pretrial system capable of balancing liberty and safety. The Holly Act, as currently conceived, falls short of that goal. A more measured and evidence-driven approach offers a stronger path forward—one that protects both the public and the constitutional values at the heart of the American criminal justice system.

Cover Photo by Getty Images on Unsplash

Author

Joanna Swaiss

References

1
See Scott Wartman et al., ‘Cultural reawakening’ part of reducing crime, Ramaswamy tells packed Cincinnati town hall, The Cin. Enquirer, https://web.archive.org/web/20260216064129/https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2025/08/04/vivek-ramaswamy-town-hall-to-discuss-crime-in-wake-of-cincinnati-brawl/85477950007 [https://perma.cc/G3CG-PA2U] (last updated Aug. 5, 2025).
2
See Haley BeMiller, VP JD Vance on Cincinnati fight: ‘What I saw was a mob of lawless thugs’, The Cin. Enquirer, https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2025/07/28/vp-jd-vance-says-those-involved-in-cincinnati-fight-should-be-jailed/85407274007 [https://perma.cc/W6WY-JYL3] (last updated July 28, 2025).
3
Id.
4
See Chris Jacobs, Holly’s Act named after Cincinnati brawl victim introduced to toughen bail, WLWT, https://www.wlwt.com/article/lawmakers-cincinnati-brawl-victim-hollys-act-ohio/70613604 [https://perma.cc/42LL-TKUV] (last updated Mar. 4, 2026). Holly’s last name has been withheld from the media.
5
See id.
6
See Jared Goffinet and Brenda Ordonez, Woman at center of viral Cincinnati brawl video makes first public appearance, FOX19, https://www.fox19.com/2025/08/06/woman-center-viral-cincinnati-brawl-video-makes-first-public-appearance [https://perma.cc/H77Q-VXGA] (last updated Aug. 6, 2025) (“[a]ccording to a study from the National Research Council, mandatory minimum sentences pose a risk to the equitable and criminal justice system with no overall benefit to crime control. Sen. Moreno’s response was that mandatory minimum sentences do help reduce crime, saying Holly’s Act would hold judges accountable and deter repeat offenders.”).
7
See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”); see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required…”).
8
See Pretrial Release and Detention: Legal Principles, Ctr. for Effective Pub. Pol’y (Aug. 2021), https://cepp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/APPR-Pretrial-Legal-Principles-Handout-August-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/S92V-L277] (discussing how federal, state, and local laws govern pretrial release).
9
See Pretrial Release and Detention in the Federal Judiciary, U.S. Courts, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/probation-and-pretrial-services/pretrial-services/pretrial-release-and-detention-federal-judiciary [https://perma.cc/2JCP-FZ98] (last visited Apr. 6, 2026) (“[t]he decision to release or detain a person charged with a crime pending trial can be among the most difficult for judges. They must balance a person’s presumed innocence and right to freedom under our Constitution against the imperative of protecting others in the community. Our laws establish a general presumption that defendants must be released before trial unless the government proves at a detention hearing that they should be detained as a danger to the community or as a flight risk.”).
10
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
11
Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (“the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”).
12
See id. at 6 (“[i]f bail in an amount greater than that usually fixed for serious charges of crimes is required in the case of any of the petitioners, that is a matter to which evidence should be directed in a hearing so that the constitutional rights of each petitioner may be preserved. In the absence of such a showing, we are of the opinion that the fixing of bail before trial in these cases cannot be squared with the statutory and constitutional standards for admission to bail.”).
13
See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987) (“[w]e have repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest…respondents concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight…”).
14
Id. at 755 (“[t]he Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling to say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon that primary concern of every government — a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens — on its face violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”).
15
See id. at 742.
16
Id. at 742-43.
17
See Ohio Const. art. I, § 9. (“excessive bail shall not be required…”); see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2937.222(c) (West 2024).
18
See Dennis Hirsch, Aligning Algorithmic Risk Assessments With Criminal Justice Values, The Ohio State U. Moritz Coll. of L., Oct. 17, 2024, at 13 (“[i]n this report, we focus on the use of the Pretrial Assessment Tool (PAT)…PAT is administered at entry into the criminal justice system to assess the offender’s flight risk and recidivism risk before trial. As a result, it is primarily used in setting bail.”), 16 (“[m]ost courts use the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS) as their primary tool for bail and sentencing decisions.”).
19
See ORAS: Ohio Risk Assessment System, U of Cin. Corr. Inst., 1 https://www.cech.uc.edu/content/dam/refresh/cech-62/ucci/overviews/oras-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3HF-AHZK] (last visited Apr. 11, 2026) (“[o]ur mission is to research, develop, disseminate and implement evidence-based practices in corrections.”); see also Edward Latessa et al., The Creation and Validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS), 74 Fed. Prob. 1, 2 (2009) (“one of the purposes of ORAS was to promote consistent and objective assessment of the risk of recidivism for offenders in Ohio.”).
20
See Shamena Anwar, What Happens When Judges Follow the Recommendations of Pretrial Detention Risk Assessment Instruments More Often?, RAND (Sept. 5, 2024), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3299-1.html [https://perma.cc/5RTB-QF4G] (“[t]here is wide variation in the extent to which judges follow the recommendations of the pretrial risk assessment…”).
21
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2937.011 (West 2025).
22
See, e.g., Nick Evans, Health Policy Institute of Ohio argues cash bail bad for community health, BG Indep. Media (Sept. 29, 2022), https://bgindependentmedia.org/health-policy-institute-of-ohio-argues-cash-bail-bad-for-community-health [https://perma.cc/2TZJ-TQPY].
23
See, e.g., id. (“[o]pponents argue the effort [to greater emphasize cash bail] punishes the poor and gives unfair advantages to the rich.”).
24
See Nick Evans, Last year’s cash bail amendment from lawmakers put Ohio’s entire pretrial release system in jeopardy, Ohio Cap. J (May 23, 2023), https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2023/05/23/last-years-cash-bail-amendment-from-lawmakers-put-ohios-entire-pretrial-release-system-in-jeopardy [https://perma.cc/4WJB-A637].
25
See, e.g., Sarah Roebuck, Ohio police association calls for reforms after viral downtown brawl, Police1 (Aug. 12, 2025), https://www.police1.com/chiefs-sheriffs/ohio-police-association-calls-for-reforms-after-viral-downtown-brawl [https://perma.cc/R4MZ-93RX].
26
See Julia Bonavita, Cincinnati brawl timeline: Brutal assault spirals into national firestorm, Fox News (Aug. 6, 2025), https://www.foxnews.com/us/cincinnati-brawl-timeline-brutal-assault-spirals-national-firestorm [https://perma.cc/68E4-G44X] (identifying time and location of brawl).
27
See Mike Wendling, Three charged with assault in connection with viral Cincinnati brawl, BBC News (July 30, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly422520k8o [https://perma.cc/GHR4-HBAH] (“[i]t is unclear what triggered the brawl early on Saturday, or what happened before or after people started recording the incident with their phones…[a]t a news conference on Monday, Chief Theetge said that out of the roughly 100 people in the area at the time, only one called police and that alcohol consumption played a part.”).
28
See Peter D’Abrosca, Viral Cincinnati beating suspects: full list of offenders, charges and custody statuses, Fox News (Aug. 30, 2025), https://www.foxnews.com/us/viral-cincinnati-beating-suspects-full-list-of-offenders-charges-and-custody-statuses [https://perma.cc/B74U-YFHG].
29
See Jennifer Baker & Jared Goffinet, Man accused of punching, knocking out woman in ‘violent attack’ gets $500K bond, FOX19 https://www.fox19.com/2025/08/15/man-accused-punching-knocking-out-woman-violent-attack-gets-500k-bond [https://perma.cc/CU3U-5CW7] (last updated Aug, 15, 2025) (“[t]he 38-year-old does have prior convictions, which include 10 misdemeanors and three felonies, according to the prosecution.”).
30
D’Abrosca, supra note 28.
31
Id.
32
See id. (“[a]t an Aug. 14 arraignment, he was ordered to remain in jail pending a mental health assessment. During that hearing, his attorney said he suffers from schizophrenia and has been found not guilty by way of insanity on previous charges.”).
33
See Jacobs, supra note 4.
34
See id. (discussing the Holly Act); see also Roebuck, supra note 25 (discussing reactions of the Hamilton County Association of Chiefs of Police and notable public figures).
35
Jacobs, supra note 4.
36
See Reps. Swearingen and LaRe Hold Press Conference on the Ohio Holly Act, Ohio House (Mar. 5, 2026), https://ohiohouse.gov/news/republican/reps-swearingen-and-lare-hold-press-conference-on-the-ohio-holly-act-142448 [https://perma.cc/SYE6-CJXV] (“‘[t]he focus of this bill is on offenders that have a violent propensity and ensuring they don’t cause more harm to our communities by being released on bail,’ said Swearingen.”).
37
Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (“the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”).
38
See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739, 748-49 (“[w]e have repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest…respondents concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight…”).
39
See H.B. 741, 136th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2026).
40
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741, 755 (“[t]he Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Act) allows a federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions ‘will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.’…The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling to say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon that primary concern of every government — a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens — on its face violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”).
41
See H.B. 741.
42
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (discussing procedural safeguards for pretrial detention determinations).
43
See Jacobs, supra note 4 (“[the Act] seeks to stop situations like [the brawl] by increasing penalties for failing to appear in court for individuals who have ignored two or more summonses in the last five years. Their bonds would increase from 10 to 25 percent…”).
44
See U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required…”); see also Ohio Const. art. I, § 9. (“excessive bail shall not be required…”); see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2937.222(c) (instructing judges that they may consider the defendant’s “financial resources” in determining bail.).
45
See, e.g., Sandra Susan Smith, How Pretrial Incarceration Diminishes Individuals’ Employment Prospects, U.S. Courts, 4 (Dec. 2022), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/86_3_3_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/798U-CKAX] (discussing how pretrial incarceration may “amplify the risks of employment instability—or staying employed with any employer over some period.”); see also, e.g., Brian Nam-Sonenstein, Research roundup: Evidence that a single day in jail causes immediate and long-lasting harms, Prison Pol’y Initiative (Aug. 6, 2024), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2024/08/06/short_jail_stays [https://perma.cc/K7HY-5J2L] (“when people are jailed, they can lose their housing, jobs, and transportation, making it harder for them to get to court…[p]eople who are detained pretrial are…also more than four times (420%) more likely to become unhoused than those who were released.”); see also, e.g., Ian A. Silver et al., Does Pretrial Detention Influence Time Until Re-Involvement with the Criminal Legal System?, 94 J. Crim. Just. 102178 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2024.102234 [https://perma.cc/9V5E-FCZT] (“[t]he results of the study suggest that spending 2–3 days, 3–7 days, and >7 days in pretrial detention was associated with an increased probability of a new criminal arrest and new violent criminal arrest earlier when compared to spending 0 to 1 day in pretrial detention.”).
46
Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 Am. Econ. Rev 201 (Feb. 2018) (abstract).
47
See H.B. 741.
48
See Meg Hilling, Ohio police chiefs call out judicial system for Cincinnati brawl, News Nation Now, https://www.newsnationnow.com/us-news/midwest/ohio-police-chiefs-cincinnati-brawl [https://perma.cc/ZWB5-T5S7] (last updated Aug. 8, 2025) (“[i]n a statement…the [Hamilton County] [A]ssociation [of Chiefs of Police] said it was appalled and deeply troubled by videos of the brawl…‘[w]e are no longer willing to remain silent while gaps in the judicial process repeatedly undermine the tireless work of our officers,’ the statement said. ‘It is not enough to arrest violent offenders if they are swiftly released back into our neighborhoods due to lax bail practices or insufficient sentencing.’”).
49
See H.B. 741.
50
See, e.g., Allie Preston, 5 Ways Cash Bail Systems Undermine Community Safety, Am. Progress (Nov. 3, 2022), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/5-ways-cash-bail-systems-undermine-community-safety [https://perma.cc/HY5M-DR7B] (“current practices in cash bail systems undermine public safety and increase recidivism. Cash bail has been associated with a 6 percent to 9 percent increase in recidivism. Pretrial incarceration, which is a frequent result of unaffordable cash bail, has a ‘criminogenic effect,’ meaning that it increases, rather than decreases, crime.”).
51
See, e.g., id. (“[p]retrial incarceration, which is a frequent result of unaffordable cash bail, has a criminogenic effect,” meaning that it increases, rather than decreases, crime. The system further harms public safety by putting at risk individuals’ and communities’ health, economic stability, employment, familial relationships, and housing at risk—and has been doing so for decades.”).