Lights, Camera, Consolidation: Antitrust Implications of the Netflix and Warner Bros. Acquisition

by Josh Smith, Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 94

I. Introduction

In 2025, Netflix announced the completion of an $82.7 billion dollar acquisition of Warner Brothers Discovery (“WBD”).¹ This transaction brings together one of the world’s largest streaming platforms with one of the largest content libraries in entertainment history.² Yet, despite closing the transaction, this acquisition remains subject to regulatory approval in accordance with United States antitrust law.³

This Article examines the proposed Netflix and WBD acquisition through the lens of modern antitrust law, focusing on how traditional frameworks under Section 7 of the Clayton Act apply to consolidation in the streaming industry. Part II provides background on the structure of the transaction, the evolution of the streaming market, and foundational antitrust principles derived from United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, United States v. Microsoft Corp., and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States. Part III analyzes the potential competitive harms raised by the acquisition, including content foreclosure, platform dominance, and non-price effects, while situating these harms within vertical and horizontal precedent under the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Guidelines. Finally, Part IV concludes by assessing the implications of the acquisition for future media consolidation and evaluating whether existing antitrust doctrine, particularly under Section 7, is equipped to address platform-driven entertainment markets.

II. Background

A. Structure of the Transaction

On December 5, 2025, Netflix reached a deal to acquire WBD in a multi-billion-dollar transaction.⁴ An acquisition, unlike a merger, is a takeover of another entity rather than the creation of a new joint organization.⁵ The deal originally combined cash and stock consideration.⁶ However, in January 2026, Netflix revised the deal to pay all cash for the acquisition with a proposed bid of $27.75 per share in an effort to prevent competitors like Paramount from rivaling their bid.⁷ Since the deal was announced, Netflix’s shares have coincidentally dropped 15%.⁸ This transaction still remains subject to shareholder consent, customary closing conditions, and most importantly, regulatory approval.⁹

This acquisition unites Netflix’s extensive global streaming platform with WBD’s significant content library, encompassing major film franchises, television programming, and premium HBO titles.¹⁰ Industry observers have noted that the integration of content creation and distribution under a single entity could reshape competitive dynamics in the streaming market.¹¹ While Netflix anticipates that the acquisition will enable broader content offerings and greater production efficiencies, the transaction has drawn attention from regulators and market analysts concerned with potential impacts on competition and content access.¹²

B. The Streaming Market

Streaming services, unlike cable or satellite TV, allow consumers to access live or on-demand shows simply by connecting to the internet.¹³ The global streaming market has grown into one of the largest segments of the media and entertainment industry, with subscription video on demand (“SVOD”) services accounting for a substantial share of how audiences consume video content.¹⁴ As of 2025, Netflix remains the largest streaming platform worldwide with over 300 million paid subscribers, outpacing competitors such as Amazon Prime Video and Disney+ based solely on the number of subscribers to the streaming platform.¹⁵ According to industry data, Netflix’s global subscriber base reached approximately 301.6 million, while Amazon and Disney+’s platforms have both trailed behind with only over 100 million subscribers.¹⁶ This data establishes Netflix’s dominant role in the marketplace and its extensive international reach.

In the United States, streaming services collectively have come to represent an increasing share of overall television consumption, with streaming accounting for nearly half of total TV viewing in late 2025, driven in part by major original content that attracts broad audiences.¹⁷ While Netflix remains the largest streaming service, competitive dynamics have shown a gradual erosion of Netflix’s relative share as challengers such as Disney+, Hulu, and HBO Max gain traction; in certain viewing metrics, platforms like Amazon Prime Video and Disney+ have narrowed the gap with Netflix and continue to diversify consumer choices.¹⁸

The market’s competitive structure remains an important backdrop for antitrust analysis: while a handful of dominant platforms capture the majority of subscribers and viewing hours, a range of other services add complexity and suggest a multiplayer environment rather than a simple duopoly.¹⁹ These trends reflect both consumer demand for diverse content and the strategic responses of incumbents as they expand, bundle, and innovate to maintain or grow their positions.

C. Regulatory Framework

Acquisitions in the United States are primarily governed by Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits those that have “the effect of which may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”²⁰ Courts and regulators assess potential competitive harms by examining market concentration, likelihood of foreclosure, and potential non-price effects such as reduced innovation or quality. There are two types of acquisitions: horizontal and vertical.²¹ Horizontal acquisitions are between competitors in the same market and are analyzed for their impact on market concentration.²² Vertical acquisitions, however, focus on combining a producer and distributor and are evaluated for potential foreclosure or preferential treatment of the merged firm’s products.²³

The Supreme Court has established foundational principles for reviewing these kinds of deals. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court examined an acquisition between Brown Shoe Co., the third largest seller of shoes, and Kinney, the eighth largest.²⁴ The Court held that in evaluating an acquisition, the proper definition of a market is a necessary predicate in examining potentially affected competition.²⁵ A market is defined as when the products are reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purpose.²⁶ Interchangeability is examined by the cross-elasticity of demand or how demand for one product responds to the price change of another similar product.²⁷ If a decrease in price causes a significant number of customers of competitors to switch brands, it would be an indication that the products compete in the same market.²⁸

Additionally, the Court emphasized assessing the effect on market concentration before approving an acquisition.²⁹ The wording of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits acquisitions where “the effect of which may be substantially to lessen competition,” requires a prognosis of the probable future effect of a proposed acquisition. The Court noted that while a highly concentrated market is a factor to consider, it is ultimately viewed under the relevant defined market and the probable effect upon the future which Section 7 of the Clayton Act commands courts and the FTC to examine.³⁰ Ultimately, the Court held that even if the industry was becoming more concentrated, that trend did not justify the acquisition.³¹ The deal here was seen by the Court as possibly tending to lessen competition in the defined relevant market of men’s, women’s, and children’s shoes in the majority of cities which both Brown and Kinney sold their products.³² United States v. Philadelphia National Bank reinforced the presumption that acquisitions significantly increasing market concentration may substantially lessen competition.³³

Moreover, the Supreme Court reviewed a proposed acquisition within commercial banking in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.³⁴ The deal was between Philadelphia National Bank acquiring Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank, the second and third largest of 42 commercial banks in the City of Philadelphia.³⁵ The Court showed a disdain towards high market concentration.³⁶ An acquisition which produces a corporation controlling an undue percentage share of the defined market, resulting in higher concentration, is so inherently likely to lessen concentration that it must be enjoined unless there is evidence that it is not likely to be anticompetitive.³⁷ The Court reasoned, using the economic theory, that competition is likely to be greatest when many sellers exist and none hold a significant market share.³⁸ Here, the Court noted that the proposed acquisition would increase concentration significantly, by 33%, so the Court enjoined the deal.³⁹

Further, digital platform acquisitions in particular have raised concerns about non-price effects, as illustrated in United States v. Microsoft Corp., which focused on the potential for exclusionary practices in technology-driven markets.⁴⁰ The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia examined how non-price effects in a digital platform context should be evaluated. The court noted that monopoly power may be inferred from a corporation’s possession of a dominant share of a relevant market that is also protected by significant barriers to entry.⁴¹ These are barriers that prevent potential new rivals from timely responding to an increase in price above the competitive level. In a digital context, the court emphasized that circumstantial evidence may indicate whether a corporation possesses monopoly power. Barriers to entry or non-price factors that courts tend to focus on include: scale-driven cost efficiencies, high set-up costs, and large research or development costs, just to name a few.⁴²

Regulatory oversight of streaming and digital media acquisitions are guided by both the FTC and DOJ Guidelines, which provide that antitrust review considers both horizontal overlaps and vertical relationships, as well as the potential for anti-competitive conduct that might not immediately affect pricing but could harm innovation, content diversity, or consumer choice.⁴³ Recent transactions in streaming and media platforms, including acquisitions involving Netflix, Disney, and WBD, have prompted the agencies to closely examine the implications of combining content libraries with distribution platforms.⁴⁴

Altogether, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, judicial precedent, and regulatory guidelines establish a framework where both horizontal and vertical aspects of the Netflix and WBD acquisition will be scrutinized. This framework emphasizes the need to consider not only traditional price effects but also dominance in a defined relevant market considering interchangeability, barriers to entry, and market concentration, particularly in rapidly evolving digital markets.

III. Discussion

A. Acquisition Type and Market Effects

The proposed acquisition of WBD by Netflix represents a vertical integration of content creation and distribution in the streaming industry, with horizontal implications due to overlapping services.⁴⁵ Netflix, as a global streaming platform would absorb WBD’s content library and HBO Max subscriber base under the transaction, dramatically expanding its scale and influence in both content production and streaming delivery.⁴⁶ Analysts and antitrust observers highlight that the combined entity’s share of the streaming market could exceed traditional 30% thresholds that often trigger heightened regulatory scrutiny under U.S. antitrust law, particularly if the relevant market is as narrowly framed as SVOD.⁴⁷ United States senators have warned that this deal could stifle innovation, reduce content diversity, and erode competition that drives quality and affordability for consumers.⁴⁸ Even within broader definitions of streaming services that include ad-supported platforms and live TV, such as YouTube TV, the combined entity’s scale would reinforce Netflix’s market domination relative to major rivals.⁴⁹

Because vertical acquisitions raise distinct competitive questions, the Netflix and WBD deal cannot be neatly categorized as purely horizontal between competing streaming services.⁵⁰ Instead, it exemplifies a hybrid consolidation: while it does not bring together two immediate competitors of equal size, it brings their complementary segments of production and a massive distribution pipeline together that could materially affect competitive incentives, content access for rivals, and consumer choice.⁵¹ The DOJ’s guidelines explain that Section 7 forbids acquisitions that may “substantially lessen competition” and that agencies look at market structure, effects on competitive constraints, potential foreclosure, barriers to entry, and trends toward market concentration as part of analyzing competitive harms under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.⁵²

B. Competitive Harms

A central focus of antitrust analysis under Section 7 of the Clayton Act is whether a proposed acquisition may “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly” through foreclosure of rivals, entrenchment of market power, reduced innovation, and diminished product quality or variety.⁵³ The DOJ Guidelines articulate that an acquisition may lessen competition if the newly combined company post-acquisition can limit rivals’ access to products or services that are competitively important, thereby weakening or excluding competitors in the market.⁵⁴ This is a form of foreclosure that often arises in vertical and hybrid acquisitions.⁵⁵

Streaming and content markets are particularly susceptible to these harms because content libraries and distribution platforms serve as essential inputs for competition: control over premium content or recommendation algorithms can tilt competitive incentives.⁵⁶ Critics of the Netflix and WBD acquisition argue that market consolidation could stifle innovation and reduce content diversity, as smaller studios and platforms lack the resources to match the merged firm’s scale and may face exclusion from lucrative distribution channels, making it harder for them to invest in new or differentiated programming.⁵⁷ Reports from the Writers Guild of America (the “Guild”) have expressed concern that such consolidation could centralize power and limit creative opportunities, potentially diminishing the range of voices and stories available to consumers.⁵⁸ The Guild warns that, if approved, this acquisition could eliminate jobs, depress wages, raise consumer prices, and reduce the diversity of content available to viewers.⁵⁹ These are precisely the harms antitrust laws were initially designed to prevent.⁶⁰

Antitrust authorities also consider the potential for an acquisition to entrench or extend a dominant position by raising barriers to entry and excluding potential competitors.⁶¹ When a post-acquisition firm gains control of significant routes to market or interoperable services, it may increase rivals’ switching costs or deprive them of scale economies needed to compete, further entrenching market power.⁶² Even in digital markets, regulators assess harms rooted in diminished innovation or fewer choices, acknowledging that competition encompasses non-price dimensions such as product quality and variety.⁶³

In the context of the Netflix and WBD acquisition, some antitrust experts have raised skepticism about arguments that unrelated platforms such as YouTube serve as competitive substitutes, noting differences in business models and content types that suggest a more narrowly defined streaming market may be more appropriate for analysis.⁶⁴ Netflix notes that this acquisition would bring down the costs of services like HBO Max for consumers, but the DOJ is historically skeptical of claims that acquisitions will bring reduced costs and often will consider if the price will be raised if consumers do not take both services like HBO Max and Netflix together.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, there are reasons regulators may be more likely to allow the transaction to proceed. Because the Netflix and WBD acquisition is largely vertical rather than horizontal, courts have been skeptical of foreclosure theories absent concrete evidence of harm, particularly in markets with multiple well-capitalized competitors.⁶⁶ District courts have historically upheld acquisition deals where the government may face difficulty proving that the deal would likely result in higher prices, reduced output, or exclusion of rivals.⁶⁷

Taken together, the potential harm of foreclosure of rivals, entrenchment of control over essential inputs, weakened incentives for innovation, and reduced diversity of content, underscore why regulators closely scrutinize acquisitions that would confer substantial market power on a single entity, particularly in dynamic digital media markets where competitive effects extend well beyond pricing alone.⁶⁸

C. Limitation of Current Antitrust Doctrine

Although U.S. antitrust law has long been anchored in the consumer welfare standard, some critics argue that the current framework struggles to capture the full range of competitive harms particularly in modern digital platform markets.⁶⁹ The consumer welfare standard is an economic framework that evaluates harm based on price increases, reduced output, or diminished quality.⁷⁰ An acquisition is generally deemed per se anticompetitive under the consumer welfare standard if it leads to higher prices or reduced output for consumers.⁷¹ Yet, in markets for digital services, including streaming and algorithmically driven platforms, harms such as reduced innovation, diminished quality, lowered privacy protections, and entrenched market power can arise even in the absence of direct price increases.⁷² This dynamic raises questions about whether current doctrine adequately addresses competition issues that extend beyond traditional price and output anticompetitive metrics.⁷³

Additionally, scholars have documented that the consumer welfare standard may be ill-suited to contexts where firms derive value from data, network effects, and multisided platforms rather than direct pricing.⁷⁴ Digital platforms often operate in two-sided markets where both users and providers interact through an intermediary.⁷⁵ A narrow emphasis on price effects can arise in digital platforms obscuring the foreclosure of nascent rivals by creating a circular dominance where the more data that’s provided, the more advertising, which inherently makes entry by smaller firms virtually impossible.⁷⁶ These criticisms are central to movements like the New Brandeis movement, which advocates against centralized private power and notes that monopolies are the ideal image of potential abusers of democracy.⁷⁷

The antitrust reform debate also highlights that existing doctrine may also be challenged by dynamic competition in digital marketplaces, where innovation cycles and platform competition evolve faster than the review processes can adapt.⁷⁸ Critics contend that traditional tools such as market concentration thresholds and price-based harms may not fully account for the ways in which platforms with large user bases and algorithmic advantages entrench their positions, making it harder for competitors to break through even when consumers do not experience immediate price increases.⁷⁹ This difficulty suggests a gap between antitrust doctrine and real-world competitive dynamics, particularly in the digital sector.⁸⁰ Nonetheless, the Netflix and WBD acquisition illustrates these tensions: antitrust authorities must grapple with harms that are not easily captured by price changes alone, including potential reductions in innovation, content diversity, and market entry opportunities, all of which are central to competition policy but less directly measurable under existing doctrine.

IV. Conclusion

The proposed Netflix and WBD acquisition presents precisely the type of consolidation that Section 7 of the Clayton Act was designed to scrutinize, particularly in dynamic digital markets where competitive harm may manifest beyond immediate price effects.⁸¹ By combining a dominant streaming distribution platform with one of the industry’s most valuable content libraries, the transaction raises credible concerns regarding foreclosure, entrenchment of market power, and diminished incentives for innovation and content diversity, the types of harms explicitly recognized by modern acquisition enforcement frameworks.⁸²

At the same time, this acquisition exposes the limitations of current antitrust doctrine, particularly the consumer welfare standard’s emphasis on short-term price effects in markets where competition increasingly occurs through quality, innovation, and access to creative inputs.⁸³ As scholars and regulators acknowledge, digital platforms often evolve more rapidly than the DOJ review processes can adapt, complicating traditional assessments of competitive harm.⁸⁴

The transaction’s largely vertical nature of acquiring a content production company with a content distributor rather than eliminating a direct horizontal distributor significantly reduces the likelihood that regulators will find substantial anticompetitive effects.⁸⁵ Additionally, in dynamic markets like streaming, there has been hesitation about blocking acquisitions based on speculative harm when multiple well-capitalized alternatives continue to exert competitive pressure.⁸⁶

Ultimately, the Netflix and WBD acquisition underscores the growing tension between established antitrust principles and the realities of platform-driven media markets. Whether courts and regulators can effectively address these challenges will shape not only the future of streaming competition but also the trajectory of antitrust enforcement in the quickly evolving digital economy.

Cover Photo by BoliviaInteligente on Unsplsh

Joshua Smith

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