Pure Versus Professional Speech: Limits to Revoking Public Employee Benefits

by Nathan Steineker, Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 94

I. Introduction

The First Amendment provides in relevant part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.”¹ Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o State shall… deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”² These provisions regulate how government employers and public benefit systems may manage the conduct of employees and retirees. The State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio (“STRS”) is a public retirement system whose administration of benefits and policies is subject to these constitutional restraints.

This Article examines a STRS policy permitting the revocation of a retiree’s benefits for conduct that could implicate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Part II provides background on pertinent federal and Ohio law, including relevant Supreme Court and Ohio precedent, an overview of the STRS, and a recent Ohio Court of Appeals decision addressing aspects of the STRS policy. Part III analyzes how a court might evaluate a decision to revoke benefits under these constitutional provisions, particularly considering the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Chiles v. Salazar.³ Part IV provides a brief conclusion on the conflicting arguments over the policy.

II. Background

The following sections provide the legal and factual background necessary to evaluate the constitutional issues raised by the STRS policy. Section A introduces the STRS and explains the structure and function of public pension funds. Section B then examines the decision in State ex rel. Back v. State Tchrs. Ret. Sys.⁴ Sections C and D outline the relevant constitutional doctrines under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, Section E reviews relevant Ohio constitutional and statutory case law.

A. The STRS of Ohio

A public pension fund is a government sponsored investment fund that provides retirement, disability, or survivor benefits to public sector employees.⁵ STRS is a retirement system that manages pension and disability benefits for Ohio public school teachers, administrators, and higher education faculty.⁶ Because STRS is a state actor, its policies must comply with applicable federal and state law.⁷

STRS serves hundreds of thousands of active, inactive, and retired teachers across Ohio.⁸ It is one of the largest public pension systems in the United States, managing over one hundred billion dollars in assets.⁹ STRS operates under the authority of the Ohio Revised Code and is fiscally independent of state and local governments.¹⁰ Its retirement board includes the state director of education or a designee, the chancellor of higher education or a designee, investment experts appointed by state officials, and members elected from both active and retired teachers.¹¹ The board oversees plan administration, investment policy, and benefit provisions for participants.¹²

STRS offers defined benefit and hybrid plan options.¹³ Members contribute fourteen percent of their salaries, and employers contribute an additional fourteen percent of payroll.¹⁴ Funding derives from both contributions and investment returns.¹⁵ Benefits include retirement allowances, disability coverage, survivor benefits, and optional health care plans.¹⁶ Because Ohio public educators generally do not participate in Social Security, STRS serves as the primary source of retirement income for its members.¹⁷ As of 2025, STRS manages $101.8 billion in assets for more than 549,000 members.¹⁸

B. The Ohio Court of Appeals Decision

In State ex rel. Back v. State Teachers Retirement System, the plaintiff, Lauren Back, was a former teacher who qualified for disability benefits through STRS after developing serious medical conditions.¹⁹ STRS approved her disability benefits in 2014 and renewed those benefits several times in subsequent years.²⁰ As a condition of receiving disability benefits, Back signed an acknowledgement form stating that she could not perform any “teaching service.”²¹ The restriction includes activities such as leading workshops, providing training, instructing students, or directing teachers or students.²²

In 2022, STRS initiated a review to determine whether Back remained eligible for disability benefits.²³ Independent medical examinations suggested that the benefits should be terminated, and STRS scheduled an appeal hearing regarding that determination.²⁴ Before the appeal hearing occurred, STRS discovered that Back had given a brief presentation at Padua Franciscan High School in March 2023.²⁵ During the event, she spoke to a student group about her experiences as an entrepreneur and answered questions.²⁶ The presentation lasted approximately 20 minutes and occurred at the invitation of a teacher who supervised the students during the event.²⁷ STRS determined that this activity constituted a “teaching service” under Ohio Revised Code § 3307.48(D) and the STRS administrative rule defining that term.²⁸ Because disability recipients are prohibited from performing any teaching service, STRS cancelled Back’s pending appeal and terminated her disability benefits retroactively to the date of the presentation.²⁹

The majority concluded that the statute grants STRS authority to define “teaching service” broadly through administrative rules.³⁰ The court reasoned that Back’s presentation to students about entrepreneurship and her responses to their questions could reasonably be characterized as instruction, even though the presentation was brief and informal.³¹ Because STRS’ interpretation fell within the broad language of the governing regulation, the court held that STRS did not violate any legal duty in terminating her benefits.³²

Judge Dingus dissented and focused on the central interpretive question: the meaning of “teaching service.”³³ He argued that the phrase “perform any teaching service” is ambiguous because it is not commonly used in ordinary language and may carry multiple meanings.³⁴ The dissent emphasized that the court should have examined the legislative intent of the Ohio General Assembly rather than deferring to STRS’ expansive interpretation of the statute.³⁵ Judge Dingus warned that the majority’s interpretation was overly broad and produced unreasonable results.³⁶ If a single guest presentation qualifies as teaching service, then many ordinary activities could disqualify disabled teachers from receiving benefits, including “participating in a book club, helping children or grandchildren with homework, contributing personal insights during a Sunday School class, or even sharing a recipe with others.”³⁷ The dissent concluded that the legislature did not intend the phrase “teaching service” to encompass isolated instances of sharing personal experiences with a group and therefore argued that STRS improperly terminated Back’s benefits.³⁸

A document titled “Teaching Limitations for Disability Recipients: was included in the magistrate’s findings of fact, which the majority subsequently upheld.³⁹ The document was originally circulated around 2018 and republished on the STRS website on December 4, 2025.⁴⁰ It states that disability benefit recipients “may not perform any teaching services while receiving STRS Ohio disability benefits.”⁴¹ The prohibition applies to “any traditional or nontraditional teaching activity, whether full time or part time, in a public or private setting, school or non-school setting, on a volunteer basis or for compensation, in or outside the state of Ohio.”⁴² The document also provides examples of activities considered prohibited teaching services, including teaching Bible studies.⁴³

C. First Amendment Case Law

The Free Exercise Clause restricts government action that targets or unduly burdens religious practice.⁴⁴ The Supreme Court’s modern Free Exercise jurisprudence provides that neutral laws of general applicability generally do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if they incidentally burden religious practice.⁴⁵ This principle was articulated in Employment Division v. Smith in 1990.⁴⁶ However, a government policy that targets religious conduct or is not neutral or generally applicable is subject to strict scrutiny.⁴⁷

Under strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that the challenged policy serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.⁴⁸ The Court reinforced these protections in more recent decisions, including Church of the Lukimi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, which invalidated municipal ordinances targeting religious practices,⁴⁹ and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, which emphasized that policies with discretionary exemption mechanisms cannot deny comparable treatment to religious conduct without triggering strict scrutiny.⁵⁰

The Court has also repeatedly held that the government may not exclude individuals from public benefits because of their religious status or activity.⁵¹ In Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer and Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, the Court held that denying otherwise available benefits based on religious status violates the Free Exercise Clause.⁵² In Carson v. Makin, the Court extended this reasoning to religious use, holding that excluding benefits because funds would be used for religious instruction violates the Free Exercise Clause.⁵³ Together, these cases establish that government actors must remain neutral toward religion and may not impose conditions on public benefits that penalize religious practice.

Teaching, tutoring, and coaching also involve expressive conduct and speech. A government policy that requires individuals to refrain from expressive activity as a condition of receiving benefits may therefore raise concerns under the First Amendment’s unconstitutional conditions doctrine.⁵⁴ In Perry v. Sindermann, the Court held that the government may not deny a benefit on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected interests, including free speech.⁵⁵ Similarly, in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, the Court reaffirmed that the government cannot condition benefits on surrendering First Amendment rights.⁵⁶ Courts nevertheless generally permit restrictions where the government is defining eligibility for a government benefit rather than penalizing speech.⁵⁷

D. Fourteenth Amendment Case Law

The Supreme Court has held that a property interest exists when a person has a legitimate claim of entitlement created by law, rather than a mere expectation of receiving a benefit.⁵⁸ In Board of Regents v. Roth, the court explained that property interests are not created by the Constitution itself but arise from independent sources such as state statutes, contracts, or regulations.⁵⁹ When those sources guarantee a benefit upon satisfaction of specified conditions, the recipient possesses a protected property interest.⁶⁰ In Perry v. Sindermann, the Court reaffirmed that property interests may arise from statutory frameworks, rules, or understandings that give individuals a legitimate expectation of continued benefits.⁶¹ Public pension systems typically satisfy this standard because they are created by statute and specify eligibility, contributions, and benefit formulas, giving retirees legal entitlement once requirements are met.⁶²

The Court applied similar reasoning to government benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly.⁶³ The Court held that welfare benefits constitute statutory entitlements that cannot be terminated without procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, including notice and an opportunity to be heard.⁶⁴ In reaching this decision, the Court noted that “the extent to which procedural due process must be afforded to the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer grievous loss, and depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.”⁶⁵

Two years later, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court confirmed that social security disability benefits are also protected property interests.⁶⁶ The Mathews Court established a three-factor balancing test to determine what process is required before revoking such benefits:

“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substantive procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”⁶⁷

Because public pension benefits similarly constitute protected property interests, the government must provide adequate procedural safeguards before terminating or reducing those benefits. This would require advance notice of the proposed termination, a meaningful opportunity to respond or appeal, and a fair administrative review process.⁶⁸

E. Ohio Case Law

The Ohio constitution provides that “[a]ll men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience.”⁶⁹ The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to offer stronger protections than the federal First Amendment by safeguarding against neutral laws of general application.⁷⁰ In Humphrey v. Lane, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a state employee could not be forced to perform duties that violated his religious beliefs when a reasonable accommodation was available, applying strict scrutiny under the Ohio Constitution.⁷¹

The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that public retirement benefits become protected property interests once the statutory requirements for eligibility are met.⁷² It has also made clear that retirement benefits administered by STRS derive from statutory entitlement and must be administered in accordance with governing law.⁷³ In State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emples. Ret. Bd., the court reaffirmed that retirement boards are required to follow statutory procedures when determining eligibility and benefit rights.⁷⁴ As a result, Ohio courts treat pension benefits as enforceable statutory rights that are subject to both administrative review and judicial oversight.

III. Discussion

The STRS policy raises two primary constitutional concerns that frame the overall analysis. First, under the First Amendment, the policy may impermissibly burden protected speech and religious exercise by conditioning disability benefits on refraining from expressive activities. Second, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the policy implicates both procedural and substantive due process by potentially depriving retirees of a statutorily created property interest through vague standards, arbitrary enforcement, and insufficient procedural protections. Together, these concerns suggest that the STRS policy, as written and applied, may unlawfully condition public benefits on the surrender of constitutional rights and fail to provide the safeguards required when the government deprives individuals of protected interests.

A. First Amendment Analysis

The most significant constitutional issue arises from the policy’s explicit prohibition on “teaching Bible studies.” Because Bible study instruction constitutes inherently religious expression, revoking benefits based on such activity may trigger scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. If STRS’ administration of the policy is neutral and generally applicable – for example, if it prohibits all teaching activity regardless of religious or secular content – the policy would likely be upheld under Smith. However, if in practice the policy targets religious activity, stricter scrutiny may apply. If STRS revokes a retiree’s benefits because a retiree teaches religion rather than because the retiree performs teaching work generally, that decision could raise constitutional concerns under Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, and Carson.

The policy at issue is derived from Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3307, which governs the STRS.⁷⁵ These provisions allow STRS to terminate a recipient’s disability benefits if they return to service or demonstrate the capacity to work.⁷⁶ STRS may argue that engaging in teaching activities demonstrates the ability to perform the duties of an educator and therefore disqualifies the recipient from disability status.

To support the policy, STRS could argue that the restriction prohibits all teaching activity regardless of religious content. STRS might also contend that teaching activities demonstrate an ability to perform professional duties and that the policy prevents recipients from collecting disability benefits while continuing to work in the same profession. Under Employment Division v. Smith, such a neutral and generally applicable rule would likely be constitutional.

Challengers of the policy, however, might argue that the explicit prohibition on “teaching Bible studies” burdens religious activity and that enforcement of the policy on that basis constitutes a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. They could further argue that the policy conditions benefits on refraining from protected speech and religious practice. In addition, challengers may contend that the policy prohibits even minimal or volunteer activities unrelated to the recipient’s disability. Finally, they may argue that the policy raises due process concerns because immediate termination and repayment obligations may require stronger procedural protections.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Chiles v. Salazar has further clarified the constitutional framework governing restrictions on instructional or advisory speech. Chiles concerned a challenge to a Colorado law regulating certain forms of professional counseling speech, raising the broader question of whether speech occurring within a professional or instructional context receives full First Amendment protection or may be more heavily regulated as part of professional conduct.⁷⁷ The Court ultimately concluded that the Colorado law was a viewpoint-based restriction because it prescribed what counselors could and could not say in voluntary counseling sessions, thus censoring speech based on viewpoint.⁷⁸ As such, the Court deemed the law subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.⁷⁹ Rather than deciding the case on its merits, the Court remanded it and directed the lower court to apply heightened scrutiny on review.

The Court’s analysis provides guidance on how courts should characterize activities such as teaching, mentoring, or leading discussions. Because these activities inherently involve communicating ideas and information, they often qualify as expressive conduct. Because the Court concluded that speech within professional relationships receives robust First Amendment protection, government policies that broadly prohibit teaching or instructional activity – even when imposed through eligibility rules for government benefits – will face greater constitutional scrutiny.

Chiles will therefore influence how courts evaluate pension rules like the STRS policy here. STRS would likely characterize its prohibition on “teaching services” as a neutral eligibility rule designed to ensure that disability recipients are not performing work that demonstrates an ability to return to the teaching profession. However, many of the activities potentially covered by the rule – such as guest lectures, tutoring, or leading Bible studies – are inherently expressive. Because Chiles reinforces the principle that instructional speech remains protected even when it occurs in professional or educational contexts, courts reviewing policies like the STRS restriction should be more inclined to treat them as burdens on protected expression rather than merely administrative eligibility criteria. In that circumstance, conditioning continued receipt of disability benefits on refraining from teaching activities could raise heightened First Amendment concerns, particularly where the policy explicitly references religious instruction such as Bible study.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis

If STRS were to terminate a retiree’s disability benefits based on allegedly prohibited activities such as teaching, a reviewing court will likely consider several key questions. First, whether the retiree possesses a protected property interest in the disability benefit. In most cases the answer is yes because eligibility is created by statute. Second, whether the termination complied with procedural due process, including adequate notice, a clear explanation of the alleged violation, and a meaningful opportunity to challenge the decision. The policy’s broad and discretionary language raises concerns that it may be applied arbitrarily without clear procedural safeguards. Third, the court will examine whether the termination was consistent with governing statutes and regulations. If STRS acts without adequate procedures or contrary to statutory requirements, the retiree may assert a violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The policy at issue broadly prohibits virtually all forms of teaching, including volunteer, religious, and indirect educational activities, and relies on a non-exhaustive list that includes vague categories such as “nontraditional teaching activity” and “duties that relate to the work of educators.” This lack of precision may fail to provide clear notice of prohibited conduct and invite arbitrary enforcement. In addition, revoking benefits without individualized assessment or sufficient procedural safeguards risks depriving retirees of a property interest without adequate process. The sweeping nature of the prohibition may also be challenged as not reasonably related to the underlying purpose of disability benefits.

These concerns are particularly evident in the treatment of Lauren Back. STRS terminated Back’s benefits and cancelled her appeal based on its interpretation of “teaching service.” If Back was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to contest whether her conduct qualified as prohibited teaching, this action may constitute a denial of procedural due process. The cancellation of her appeal is especially troubling because it effectively terminated her ability to challenge the deprivation. Back’s conduct – a single alumni workshop presentation – arguably does not constitute traditional teaching services, and a reasonable person might not understand that such a one-time, informal activity would result in the loss of benefits. By treating this isolated event as grounds for full termination, STRS may have acted in a manner that is both overbroad and disproportionate. If the policy is intended to prevent employment inconsistent with a disability, penalizing minimal or incidental activity may not be rationally related to that objective. The severity of the consequences, complete termination of benefits, further supports the argument that the action was arbitrary or excessive, strengthening a potential substantive due process claim.

IV. Conclusion

STRS has adopted a policy that allows retirees’ disability benefits to be revoked under circumstances that raise potential First and Fourteenth Amendment concerns. The policy is likely constitutional if interpreted as a neutral restriction preventing disability recipients from performing teaching work, because it merely defines eligibility for benefits. Courts generally allow pension systems to terminate disability benefits if recipients demonstrate their ability to perform their professional duties. However, the policy’s explicit reference to “teaching Bible studies” raises potential Free Exercise concerns, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court cases protecting religious participation in public benefit programs. If the policy is interpreted as penalizing religious instruction rather than teaching generally, it could face constitutional challenges. Finally, the policy implicates both procedural and substantive due process by potentially depriving retirees of a statutorily created property interest through vague standards, arbitrary enforcement, and insufficient procedural protections. Retirees should be alert to any enforcement actions or guidance suggesting that religious activities are being singled out or treated differently from comparable secular teaching and should document such instances to preserve potential constitutional claims. STRS could reduce constitutional risk by revising the policy to use clear, neutral language that applies uniformly to all forms of teaching activity, while also providing defined standards and robust procedural safeguards before benefits are terminated.

Cover Photo by Volodymyr Hryshchenko on Unsplash

Nathan Steineker

References

1
U.S. Const. amend. I.
2
U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
3
Chiles v. Salazar, No. 24-539, 2026 LX 144481 (Mar. 31, 2026).
4
State ex rel. Back v. State Tchrs. Ret. Sys., 2025-Ohio-5644 (10th Dist.).
5
See, e.g., AFSCME Retirees Bulletin, Public Pension Q & A, Am. Fed’n St., Cnty. Mun. Emp. (June 2018), www.afscme.org/about/downloadable-asset/Pensions-QA.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY7S-PD9N].
6
STRS Ohio at a Glance, STRS Ohio, https://www.strsoh.org/about/strs-ohio-at-a-glance.html [https://perma.cc/XM8Q-5U8G].
7
See, e.g., Pension Facts & Retirement Basics: Pension Governance & Oversight, Nat. Conf. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. (last visited Mar. 6, 2026), https://www.ncpers.org/pension-facts#:~:text=Are%20public%20pensions%20governed%20by,plans%20often%20reflect%20ERISA’s%20language. [https://perma.cc/GKY6-PY8M].
8
STRS Ohio at a Glance, supra note 6.
9
Id.
10
Id.; see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3307.04 (Page, Lexis Advance through File 57 of the 136^th General Assembly (2025-2026)).
11
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3307.05 (Page, Lexis Advance through File 57 of the 136^th General Assembly (2025-2026)).
12
Id. § 3307.03 (Page, Lexis Advance through File 57 of the 136^th General Assembly (2025-2026)).
13
STRS Ohio at a Glance, supra note 6.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See, e.g., Social security and Your Pension, STRS Ohio (June 10, 2024), https://www.strsoh.org/newsroom/2024/social-security-and-your-pension.html [https://perma.cc/ZWH3-SX8F].
18
STRS Ohio at a Glance, supra note 6.
19
State ex rel. Back v. State Tchrs. Ret. Sys., 2025-Ohio-5644, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.).
20
Id.
21
Id. at ¶ 2.
22
Id.
23
Id. at ¶ 5.
24
Id.
25
Id. at ¶ 6.
26
Id. at ¶ 7.
27
Id.
28
Id. at ¶ 1.
29
Id. at ¶ 8.
30
Id. at ¶ 12.
31
Id. at ¶ 13.
32
Id. at ¶ 15.
33
Id. at ¶ 17.
34
Id. at ¶ 19.
35
Id. at ¶ 20.
36
Id. at ¶ 22.
37
Id. (emphasis added).
38
Id. at ¶ 23.
39
Id. at ¶ 36.
40
Id.; see also Teaching Limitations for Disability Benefit Recipients, STRS Ohio (Dec. 4, 2025), https://www.strsoh.org/newsroom/2025/teaching-limitations-for-disability-benefit-recipients.html [https://perma.cc/9ZN2-2J7A].
41
Back, 2025-Ohio-5644 at ¶ 36 (Ohio Ct. App.).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (“A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”).
45
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“The right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”) (internal quotations omitted).
46
Id.
47
See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”).
48
Id. at 531-32.
49
Id. at 542 (“The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents and their religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense. These ordinances are not neutral, and the court below committed clear error in failing to reach this conclusion.”).
50
Fulton v. City of Phila., 593 U.S. 522, 524 (2021) (“The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless the agency agrees to certify same-sex couples as foster parents cannot survive strict scrutiny and violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”).
51
See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449, 462 (2017) (“The Department’s policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character. If the cases just described make one thing clear, it is that such a policy imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.”); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464, 487 (2020) (“A State need not subsidize private education. But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.”); Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 789 (2022) (“Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for its otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Regardless of how the benefit and restriction are described, the program operates to identify and exclude otherwise eligible schools on the basis of their religious exercise.”).
52
Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S. at 466-67; Espinoza, 591 U.S. 487.
53
Carson, 596 U.S. 789.
54
See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (The government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests – especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”).
55
Perry, 408 U.S. 597 (1972).
56
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214 (2013) (“The Government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57
Id. at 213; see also Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 591 U.S. 430, 439 (2020) (“[B]ecause foreign organizations operating abroad do not possess constitutional rights, those foreign organizations do not have a First Amendment right to disregard the Policy Requirement.”).
58
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
62
See, e.g., id. at 594 (“A person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.”).
63
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
64
Id. at 270.
65
Id. at 262-63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
67
Id. at 335.
68
See, e.g., id. at 348-49.
69
Ohio Const. art. I, § 7.
70
See, e.g., Humphrey v. Lane, 89 Ohio St. 3d 62, 68, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (2000).
71
Id. at 69-71.
72
See, e.g., Herrick v. Lindley, 59 Ohio St. 2d 22, 26-7, 391 N.E.2d 729, 732-33 (1979) (Although ‘[t]he granting of a retirement allowance, annuity, or pension to any person pursuant to action of the state teachers’ retirement board vests a right to such person … to receive such retirement allowance, annuity, or pension at the rate fixed at the time of granting such retirement allowance, annuity, or pension,” taxing benefits was allowable as “[t]he vesting statutes prohibit only a reduction in the rate of employment. They do not prohibit the imposition of a tax.”).
73
State ex rel. McLean v. Ret. Bd., 161 Ohio St. 327, 327, 119 N.E.2d 70, 71 (1954) (“The right of a member of the Public Employees Retirement System to disability retirement allowance is governed by the statutes in force when such member becomes eligible for and is granted such retirement, and that right can not be reduced or denied by subsequent legislation.”).
74
State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 2008-Ohio-6254, ¶ 44, 120 Ohio St. 3d 386, 395-96, 899 N.E.2d 975, 984 (The claim at issue was not collaterally estopped because both Ohio Supreme Court’s prior cases on the Public Employee Retirement System did not decide whether the employer was a public employer. Therefore, the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board abused its discretion in denying the claims.)
75
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3307.01-3307.99 (Page, Lexis Advance through File 57 of the 136th General Assembly (2025-2026)).
76
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3307.48 (Page, Lexis Advance through File 57 of the 136th General Assembly (2025-2026)).
77
Chiles v. Salazar, No. 24-539, 2026 LX 144481 at *2 (Mar. 31, 2026)
78
Id.
79
Id.