The Tragedy of Adriana Smith: Remedying Statutory Ambiguity in a Post-Dobbs Society

by Joanna Swaiss, Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 94

I. Introduction

In February 2025, Adriana Smith (“Smith”) was declared brain-dead at Emory University Hospital (“Emory”) after physicians identified extensive blood clots in her brain.¹ At the time, Smith was nine weeks pregnant.² Emory expressed concern that withdrawing life support would expose them to criminal liability under Georgia House Bill 481—the Living Infants Fairness and Equality (“LIFE”) Act—which prohibits abortion after the sixth week of pregnancy.³ Because discontinuing life support would have also ended the fetus’s life, Emory elected to maintain life support for four months until her son, Chance, was born, without providing Smith’s family with “any say in the matter.”⁴

Prior to the enactment of the LIFE Act, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, determined that there was no federal Constitutional right to an abortion and returned primary regulatory authority on this matter to the states.⁵ In the wake of this case, fetal personhood statutes have generated significant legal uncertainty for healthcare providers. This blog argues that ambiguity in post-Dobbs statutory frameworks incentivizes hospitals to default to extreme measures to avoid prosecution—often at the expense of patient autonomy and family consent.

Part II provides background on abortion jurisprudence before and after Dobbs and Georgia’s LIFE Act. Part III analyzes how legal uncertainty shaped Emory’s decision-making, informed by bioethical principles and emerging legal scholarship. Part IV proposes legislative reform through Adriana’s Law, introduced by Georgia State Representative, Park Cannon, to clarify the limits of fetal personhood statutes and prevent similar tragedies in the future.⁶ As one reproductive rights advocate observed following Smith’s case, unresolved “gray areas” in these statutes create precisely the kind of danger reflected in situations like Smith’s.⁷

II. Background

In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the constitutional right to an abortion.⁸ Although abortion is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the Court inferred a fundamental right to privacy derived from substantive due process.⁹ Building on prior cases that recognized constitutional protection for intimate family and reproductive decisions, the Court reasoned that the decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy fell within a protected zone of personal privacy.¹⁰ To implement this right, Roe established a trimester framework:

(a) For the stage [before] approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision…must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.

(b) For the stage [after] approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may…regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.

(c) For the stage [after] viability, the State[,] in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life[,] may…regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.¹¹

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed Roe’s core holding that the Constitution protects a pre-viability right to abortion, but it abandoned the trimester framework.¹² Instead, it held that states may not impose regulations that create an “undue burden” on access to a pre-viability abortion, while permitting broader state regulation after viability.¹³Roe and Casey were two of the most contentious Supreme Court cases in American history.¹⁴ In response to it, several state legislatures enacted or preserved anti-abortion laws—such as trigger laws, statements of policy, and dormant pre-Roe bans—designed to take effect if the Supreme Court overturned Roe.¹⁵ In 2022, this expectation became a reality.¹⁶

A. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization

In June 2022, the Supreme Court overturned Roe and Casey, holding that the Constitution does not confer a woman’s right to an abortion.¹⁷ The court reasoned that the Constitution protects only those rights that are deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition, concluding that abortion did not meet that standard at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.¹⁸ Accordingly, the Court returned primary regulatory authority over abortion to the states.¹⁹

After this ruling, several states, particularly in the South, enacted new anti-abortion laws or revived dormant statutes.²⁰ Georgia’s LIFE Act is among the most consequential of these measures. The LIFE Act generally prohibits abortions after six weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions for rape, incest, futile pregnancies, or medical emergencies.²¹ The statute also amends the general definitions section of the Georgia Code to provide that: (1) a “natural person” includes “an unborn child;” (2) an “unborn child” is defined as “a member of the species Homo sapiensat any stage of development who is carried in the womb;” and (3) an unborn child with a detectable human heartbeat is included in population-based determinations.²²

Penalties for physicians who violate the LIFE Act include “imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years,” civil liability, and professional licensing sanctions.²³ When enacted in 2019, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia initially ruled that the LIFE Act was unconstitutional.²⁴ However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this ruling in July 2022—a month after Dobbs—permitting the statute to take effect.²⁵

B. How the LIFE Act Affected Smith

On February 19, 2025, Emory declared Smith brain-dead.²⁶ Under Georgia law, brain death constitutes legal death.²⁷ In the absence of a medical directive, medical-decision-making authority would ordinarily transfer to a legally authorized surrogate or a patient’s family.²⁸ However, in this instance, without providing Smith’s family any meaningful role in the decision-making process, Emory kept Smith on life support until delivery, citing concern that terminating life support before birth would violate the LIFE Act.²⁹

On June 13, 2025, Chance was born prematurely via emergency C-section.³⁰ Emory discontinued life support to Smith four days later.³¹ At birth, Chance weighed one pound and thirteen ounces and required intensive neonatal care.³² As of December 2025, he remains hospitalized at Emory, unable to breathe independently due to severe pulmonary underdevelopment.³³

April Newkirk, Smith’s mother, described the situation as a “nightmare,” publicly stating that: “I [am] not saying we would have chosen to terminate her pregnancy. But I [am] saying we should have had a choice…I think all women should have a choice about their [bodies].”³⁴ Smith’s case drew national and international media attention and sparked outrage, prompting discussion about abortion laws, reproductive healthcare, consent, and end-of-life care.³⁵

III. Discussion

Part III argues that when fetal personhood statutes are applied outside their core abortion context, legal ambiguity creates structural incentives for hospitals to prioritize fetal preservation over patient autonomy. As Smith’s case demonstrates, post-Dobbs abortion laws do not merely regulate access to abortion procedures; they can reshape medical decision-making in ways that displace the autonomy of pregnant patients—even after death.

Applying principles of statutory interpretation, risk regulation, and medical ethics, this Part demonstrates that: (1) brain death is universally recognized as legal death, terminating the patient’s legal interests and transferring decision-making authority to a surrogate; (2) the ambiguous interaction between fetal personhood provisions and criminal enforcement mechanisms dramatically increases institutional risk; and (3) hospitals operating under threat of prosecution, civil liability, and professional discipline predictably default to the most legally protective course of action, even when that course conflicts with ethical norms.

This Part then explains how these pressures converged in Smith’s case, effectively reframing the fetus as the primary patient and displacing the legally recognized authority of the surrogate decision-maker. Ultimately, it argues that post-Dobbs fetal personhood regimes do more than restrict abortion access—they erode pregnant patients’ autonomy.

A. Interpretations of Georgia Law

Varying public responses to Smith’s case revealed the ambiguity of the LIFE Act. The following competing readings illustrate the core problem that this article identifies: when statutes governing abortion contain ambiguous fetal personhood language, hospitals must make high-stakes medical decisions without clear legal guidance.

When asked to comment on the case, Emory could not speak specifically about Smith’s care due to confidentiality obligations. However, it stated generally that clinicians’ medical decisions were guided by professional experience and norms, medical literature, and ethical and legal considerations.³⁶

In response to a Democratic senator’s inquiry regarding Smith’s case, the office of Christopher Carr (“Carr”), Georgia’s Republican Attorney General, stated: “There is nothing in the LIFE Act that requires medical professionals to keep a woman on life support after brain death. Removing life support is not an action ‘with the purpose to terminate a pregnancy.’”³⁷ Emory did not respond to this statement.³⁸ Similar to Carr’s response, law professors and bioethicists Thaddeus Pope and Lois Shepherd agreed that the law did not legally require Emory to continue life support, because Georgia law does not explicitly prohibit discontinuing medical treatment of brain-dead pregnant women.³⁹

In contrast, Ed Setzler, a Republican Georgia Senator and sponsor of the LIFE Act, publicly agreed with Emory’s reading of the statute.⁴⁰ Law professor Mary Ziegler noted that the LIFE Act’s fetal personhood provision and its lack of clarity were the likely cause of Emory’s approach to Smith’s treatment.⁴¹ These varying responses show how ambiguous statutes can lead to differing interpretations in high-stakes situations. Even though Carr would not have prosecuted Emory for removing Smith’s life support, the statute’s wording and lack of explicit carve-outs created uncertainty.

B. Institutional Risk Aversion

Although these competing views suggest that the law did not explicitly require continued life support, the practical realities of legal uncertainty often lead hospitals to adopt the most risk-averse course. The executive director of SisterSong, an organization that advocates for reproductive rights for women of color, commented on the situation, stating that it is not a “black and white” issue and that unresolved “gray areas” in the statutory framework created the very danger reflected in Smith’s case.⁴² Kimberly Mutcherson, a law professor, argued that laws such as the LIFE Act made an outcome like Smith’s “inevitable.”⁴³

Even though Carr later stated that removing Smith from life support would not have violated the LIFE Act, such post hoc assurances provide little protection to medical institutions who may be confronted with potential criminal liability. Criminal statutes are enforced after the fact, and prosecutorial discretion is inherently discretionary, nonbinding, and subject to change across jurisdictions and administrations.⁴⁴ Thus, informal assurances cannot eliminate the risk of future enforcement where statutory language remains ambiguous.

Therefore, hospitals must not only assess the statute’s text, but also the possibility of becoming a test case in a politically charged legal environment. In the context of fetal personhood statutes, where violations may impose criminal prosecution, civil liability, and professional discipline, institutions are incentivized to interpret the law as conservatively as possible.⁴⁵ The fact that even an unsuccessful prosecution could result in substantial financial and reputational costs to a hospital further compounds this risk calculus.⁴⁶ As a result, legal ambiguity does not create flexibility for providers; rather, it pushes hospitals toward defensive decision-making designed to minimize liability—even when those decisions conflict with patient interests or medical ethics.

Across all fifty states, brain death constitutes legal death, terminating the patient’s own legal interests and shifting medical decision-making authority to a legally authorized surrogate.⁴⁷ Ethical frameworks grounded in respect for autonomy and substituted judgment require clinicians to honor the patient’s wishes or, when those wishes are unknown, to defer to a designated surrogate or the patient’s family to make decisions on the patient’s behalf.⁴⁸ In Smith’s case, however, Emory effectively reframed the clinical and ethical inquiry by treating the fetus as the primary patient.⁴⁹ Once the fetus was understood as an independent, rights-bearing entity under Georgia law, Emory treated Smith’s body merely as a means of sustaining another patient, rather than as a site of legally protected bodily integrity.⁵⁰

The ethical pressures confronting clinicians were not purely legal or one-sided. Medical ethics emphasizes a professional commitment to preserve life when treatment is medically feasible and provide care consistent with respect for human life.⁵¹ Similarly, professional guidance in obstetrics encourages efforts to optimize fetal outcomes when possible.⁵² In situations where a pregnancy might be sustained to viability, clinicians may perceive an ethical obligation to continue life-sustaining interventions when doing so could result in a live birth. These professional norms help explain why, amid legal ambiguity, providers may view continued treatment as both legally and ethically justified.

However, the presence of ethical considerations does not resolve the underlying problem created by legal ambiguity. Professional norms require physicians to balance promoting a patient’s well-being with respect for patient autonomy.⁵³ When uncertainty in statutes effectively elevates fetal preservation above all other ethical principles, the result is not the exercise of medical judgment; rather, it is defensive decision-making driven by liability avoidance rather than patient-centered care.

Emory’s decision to keep Smith on life support raised profound ethical concerns regarding consent, dignity, and autonomy. By prioritizing fetal preservation, Emory’s actions revealed how fetal personhood statutes can reallocate decision-making authority away from pregnant patients and their families. This displacement reveals a deeper structural problem: post-Dobbs abortion laws do not merely regulate access to abortion procedures; they can also reshape medical decision-making in contexts far removed from abortion. When fetal personhood provisions operate alongside severe penalties and ambiguous statutory language, hospitals may treat the fetus as the primary legal patient—even when the pregnant woman has been declared legally dead. In doing so, these statutes effectively erode the autonomy of pregnant patients and their families.

C. Adriana’s Law

Democratic State Representative Park Cannon proposed the enactment of Adriana’s Law, which would “affirm that individuals retain agency over their bodies and medical decisions, even under restrictive fetal personhood regimes.”⁵⁴ On the day that Emory discontinued Smith’s life support, Congresswoman Nikema Williams, joined by Congresswomen Ayanna Pressley and Sara Jacobs, introduced the following resolution:

The House of Representatives urges the government of States— (A) to repeal State laws [that] ban or criminalize abortion and abortion-related services; (B) to repeal laws that exclude pregnant people from having their advance directives come into effect; [and] (C) to clarify how anti-abortion laws giving rights to fetuses should be interpreted in medical settings, prioritizing the health and well-being of pregnant patients…⁵⁵

As of February 2026, this resolution remains pending before the House of Representatives.⁵⁶

Such legislation could significantly reduce the uncertainty that contributed to Smith’s case. By explicitly stating that abortion restrictions do not apply after a patient has been declared legally dead, such laws would provide hospitals with clear guidance and protect clinicians who act in good faith. Had this clarification existed at the time of Smith’s hospitalization, Emory may have been able to present her family with the full range of legally permissible medical options, including the possibility of withdrawing life support. In this way, Adriana’s Law represents an effort to ensure that existing end-of-life doctrines remain intact within the evolving post-Dobbs legal landscape.

IV. Conclusion

Legislative clarification is essential to ensure that anti-abortion statutes do not unintentionally override longstanding end-of-life principles or produce outcomes that the legislature neither anticipated nor intended. Reform should confirm that abortion restrictions do not apply once a pregnant patient has been declared legally dead, protect physicians who rely on good faith for brain-death determinations, and reaffirm the authority of designated surrogates. By eliminating ambiguity, such measures would reduce institutional risk and realign clinical decision-making with ethical norms and respect for patient autonomy.

Cover Photo by Kelly Sikkema on Unsplash

Joanna Swaiss

References

1
See Jeff Amy et al., Hospital tells family brain-dead Georgia woman must carry fetus to birth because of abortion ban, Associated Press (May 16, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/pregnant-woman-brain-dead-abortion-ban-georgia-a85a5906e5b2c4889525f2300c441745 [https://perma.cc/PF3E-K55X%5D.
2
See id. (clarifying that Smith was about nine weeks pregnant).
3
See Minyvonne Burke, Georgia mother says she is being forced to keep brain-dead pregnant daughter alive under abortion ban law, NBC News(May 15, 2025), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/family-forced-keep-brain-dead-pregnant-woman-alive-rcna207002 [https://perma.cc/W4YK-929B%5D (explaining how Emory’s decision was based on Georgia’s anti-abortion law); see also Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9B-2 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2025 Sess.) (as amended by 2019 Ga. Laws 234, § 10 (H.B. 481)) (“As early as six weeks’ gestation, an unborn child may have a detectable human heartbeat… [e]xcept in the case of a medical emergency or when a pregnancy is diagnosed as medically futile, no abortion shall be performed or attempted to be performed unless the physician performing such procedure has first made a determination of the probable gestational age presence of a detectable human heartbeat…of an unborn child.”).
4
Burke, supra note 3; see also Amy et al., supra note 1 (“Removing breathing tubes and other life-saving devices would likely kill the fetus.”); see also Baby delivered from brain-dead woman on life support in Georgia, Associated Press (June 17, 2025), https://web.archive.org/web/20250617175104/https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/baby-delivered-brain-dead-woman-life-support-georgia-122935558 [https://perma.cc/68GP-PUHP] (reporting delivery of Chance and plan to take Smith off of life support).
5
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 231 (2022) (“The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision…”); id. at 292 (“…the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the people and their elected representatives.”).
6
See Rhian Lubin, Funeral held for Georgia woman kept on life support until baby could be delivered: ‘Adriana’s voice will be heard, The Indep. (June 29, 2025), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/adriana-smith-georgia-brain-dead-abortion-laws-b2778956.html [https://perma.cc/R5FN-47DL] (crediting the idea of Adriana’s Law to Parker Cannon).
7
See Burke, supra note 3.
8
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (“A state criminal abortion statute…that excepts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
9
See id. at 168 (“The Constitution nowhere mentions a specific right of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, but the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers more than those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights.”); id.at 116 (explaining that the due process clause protects the right to privacy “against state action.”).
10
See id. at 155 (“Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant. We agree with this approach.”), 169-70 (listing various Supreme Court cases that held that the Due Process Clause protects “freedom of personal choice” in matters of family life).
11
Id. at 164-65.
12
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe’s essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts. First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.”), 878 (“We reject the rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade.”). Fetal viability refers to the fetus’s ability to survive outside of the uterus. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (“[w]ith respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”).
13
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”).
14
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles And Policies § 10.3.3.1 886 (5th ed. 2019) (“Few decisions in Supreme Court history have provoked the intense controversy that has surrounded the abortion rulings.”).
15
See States Probe Limits of Abortion Policy, Stateline (Apr. 23, 2007), https://stateline.org/2006/06/22/states-probe-limits-of-abortion-policy%5Bhttps://perma.cc/U8VV-GLWQ%5D.
16
See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 302 (2022) (“Roe and Casey arrogated that authority. We now overrule those decisions.”).
17
See id. (“Roe and Casey arrogated that authority. We now overrule those decisions.”); id. at 231 (“The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision…”).
18
See id. at 337-38.
19
See id. at 292 (“…the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the people and their elected representatives.”).
20
See Adriel Bettelheim, Abortions surged in states near those with new bans: study, Axios (Sept. 7, 2023), https://web.archive.org/web/20230907175324/https://www.axios.com/2023/09/07/abortions-surged-state-bans [https://perma.cc/LS57-QDMY] (“Virginia is the only southern state that hasn’t banned or restricted abortion since the fall of Roe.”).
21
See H.B. 481, § IV, VIII (Ga. 2019) (No abortion “is authorized or will be performed if an unborn child has been determined to have a human heartbeat except when: a physician determines…a medical emergency exists…the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest in which an official police report has been filed alleging the offense of rape or incest…or the pregnancy is medically futile…[a]s early as six weeks’ gestation, an unborn child may have a detectable human heartbeat.”). A futile pregnancy is one where “in reasonable medical judgment, an unborn child has a profound and irremediable congenital or chromosomal anomaly that is incompatible with sustaining life after birth.” Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-141(a)(4) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2025 Sess.).
22
Ga. Code Ann. § 1-2-1(b), (d), (e)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2025 Sess.).
23
Id. § 16-12-140 (establishing terms of imprisonment); see also id. § 31-9B-2(b) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2025 Sess.) (“In addition to any criminal or civil penalties provided by law, failure by any physician to conform to any requirement of this Code section constitutes unprofessional conduct for purposes of paragraph (7) of subsection (a) of Code Section 43-34-8 relating to medical licensing sanctions.”).
24
See Maya Prabhu, Federal judge throws out Georgia’s anti-abortion law, Atlanta J-Const. (July 13, 2020), https://web.archive.org/web/20200714000445/https://www.ajc.com/news/state–regional-govt–politics/federal-judge-throws-out-georgia-anti-abortion-law/WKIkpZp5AUFvP6o43T99FK [https://perma.cc/6LWK-ADVJ] (a federal judge ruled the law to be unconstitutional in 2020); see also H.B. 481, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2019) (“This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Living Infants Fairness and Equality (LIFE) Act.’”).
25
See Maya Prabhu, Federal court says Georgia’s anti-abortion law can now be enforced, Atlanta J-Const. (July 20, 2022), https://www.ajc.com/politics/federal-court-allows-georgias-anti-abortion-law-to-take-effect/2OWMEZNE3VHQFFH6CLYM4B2JIQ/?fbclid=IwAR12M4skUxlrCPgtfpA5GZajXwubz8Myrt7c3tD1NuJnshSns3S-MBkEcJY [https://perma.cc/FUY5-A4HT].
26
See Mary Kekatos, A pregnant brain-dead woman in Georgia was kept on life support. Experts say it raises ethical, legal questions, ABC News (June 19, 2025), https://abcnews.com/Health/pregnant-brain-dead-woman-georgia-life-support-experts/story?id=122963319 [https://perma.cc/X3SD-GV52] (listing February 19 as the date Smith was declared brain-dead).
27
See GA. Code Ann. § 31-10-16 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2025 Sess.) (“A person may be pronounced dead…if it is determined that the individual has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.”).
28
See Kathy Cerminara & Alan Meisel, End of Life Care, Hastings Ctr. for Bioethics (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/briefingbook/end-of-life-care [https://perma.cc/6JJZ-AQJB] (“When individuals lose the capacity to make their own medical decisions, the interest in autonomy requires that decisions be based on wishes they expressed earlier in their lives. This position has been adopted into law: all states recognize the legal authority of advance directives such as living wills and health care powers of attorney. It is well-accepted both by bioethicists and the law that oral statements previously made by patients—either instead of written advance directives or to supplement them—may also be useful guides in determining what medical treatments they do and do not want…When individuals have not made manifest their decisions about medical care, the ethical and legal protocol is to implement a person’s presumed wishes through a doctrine known as ‘substituted judgment.’ Under this doctrine, a surrogate must make decisions for a patient. If the patient has not appointed a surrogate in an advance directive, close family members are ethically and legally empowered to make decisions for the patient.”).
29
See Burke, supra note 3 (explaining the family’s lack of choice in the decision to keep Smith on life support).
30
See Baby delivered from brain-dead woman on life support in Georgia, supra note 4 (reporting delivery of Chance and plan to take Smith off life support).
31
See Rachel Scott et al., ‘Nightmare’: Woman kept on life support for months due to abortion ban, mother says, ABC News (Dec. 11, 2025), https://abcnews.com/US/nightmare-woman-life-support-months-due-abortion-ban/story?id=128252936 [https://perma.cc/WFE6-82JR].
32
See Madeline Halpert, Baby of brain-dead woman delivered in Georgia, woman’s mother says, BBC News (June 17, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1jwl9l9yneo [https://perma.cc/AHZ7-MXC3].
33
See Dan Raby, Baby boy born to brain-dead Georgia mother remains hospitalized nearly 6 months later, family says, CBS Atlanta (Dec. 4, 2025), https://www.cbsnews.com/atlanta/news/baby-born-brain-dead-adrianna-smith-georgia-mother-health-update/ [https://perma.cc/N9C2-LSFD]; see also Scott, supra note 31 (discussing the status of Chance’s health).
34
Scott, supra note 31 (use of the word “nightmare”); Erin Keller, Brain-dead mom forced to be kept alive because of Georgia’s anti-abortion laws gives birth via C-section,The Indep. (June 17, 2025), https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/americas/georgia-brain-dead-mom-gives-birth-b2771564.html [https://perma.cc/3XMX-5WNK].
35
See Maya Prabhu, Groups on either side of abortion divide flock to brain-dead Georgia woman’s cause, Atlanta J-Const. (May 23, 2025), https://web.archive.org/web/20250524035520/https://www.ajc.com/politics/2025/05/groups-on-either-side-of-abortion-divide-flock-to-brain-dead-georgia-womans-cause [https://perma.cc/T3AN-MSJX] (discussing media attention and abortion debate); see also, e.g., Arthur Caplan, The Adriana Smith Case Unfolding in Atlanta Raises Many Questions, Bioethics Today (May 22, 2025), https://bioethicstoday.org/blog/the-adriana-smith-case-unfolding-in-atlanta-raises-many-questions [https://perma.cc/W42V-SA9N] (discussing “thorny ethical questions” about consent and end-of-life care).
36
See Scott, supra note 31.
37
Sam Gringlas, A brain-dead woman’s pregnancy raises questions about Georgia’s abortion law, NPR (May 21, 2025), https://www.npr.org/2025/05/21/nx-s1-5405542/a-brain-dead-womans-pregnancy-raises-questions-about-georgias-abortion-law [https://perma.cc/EU7J-HP5E].
38
See id.
39
See Amy et al., supra note 1.
40
See id. (“‘I think it is completely appropriate that the hospital do what they can to save the life of the child,’ Setzler said. ‘I think this is an unusual circumstance, but I think it highlights the value of innocent human life. I think the hospital is acting appropriately.’ Setzler said he believes it is sometimes acceptable to remove life support from someone who is brain dead, but that the law is ‘an appropriate check’ because the mother is pregnant. He said Smith’s relatives have ‘good choices,’ including keeping the child or offering it for adoption.”).
41
See Gringlas, supra note 39.
42
Burke, supra note 3; see also About Us, Sistersong, https://www.sistersong.net/about-x2 [https://perma.cc/BK5Z-JRR7] (last visited Feb. 8, 2026) (explaining organization’s mission).
43
Kimberly Mutcherson, A Brain-Dead Woman Is Being Kept on Machines to Gestate a Fetus. It Was Inevitable, N.Y. Times (May 24, 2025), https://web.archive.org/web/20250524141147/https
44
See Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Criminal Law, Bridge Legal (2026), https://bridgelegal.org/understanding-prosecutorial-discretion-criminal-law/ [https://perma.cc/9Z46-XS8K] (explaining the concept of prosecutorial discretion).
45
See Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9B-2(b) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2025 Sess.) (“In addition to any criminal or civil penalties provided by law, failure by any physician to conform to any requirement of this Code section constitutes unprofessional conduct for purposes of paragraph (7) of subsection (a) of Code Section 43-34-8 relating to medical licensing sanctions.”).
46
See Potential Consequences of a Government Investigation, RFZ L. LLP (Nov. 1, 2023), https://zfzlaw.com/potential-consequences-of-a-government-investigation [https://perma.cc/W4JJ-JGZG] (explaining how financial and reputational harm can result from criminal charges, regardless of the charge’s ultimate disposition).
47
See Thomas Cochrane, Determination and Associated Controversies of Brain Death, Neurology Advisor (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.neurologyadvisor.com/features/determination-and-associated-controversies-of-brain-death [https://perma.cc/UN9V-ZDFU] (“Brain death is recognized in all 50 of the United States as legally equivalent to death determined the traditional way — by demonstrating that breathing and blood circulation have stopped. Because ‘brain dead’ is legally the same thing as ‘dead,’ there is no legal obligation to continue interventions that sustain respiration or circulation.”).
48
See Cerminara & Meisel, supra note 28 (“When individuals lose the capacity to make their own medical decisions, the interest in autonomy requires that decisions be based on wishes they expressed earlier in their lives. This position has been adopted into law: all states recognize the legal authority of advance directives such as living wills and health care powers of attorney. It is well-accepted both by bioethicists and the law that oral statements previously made by patients—either instead of written advance directives or to supplement them—may also be useful guides in determining what medical treatments they do and do not want…When individuals have not made manifest their decisions about medical care, the ethical and legal protocol is to implement a person’s presumed wishes through a doctrine known as ‘substituted judgment.’ Under this doctrine, a surrogate must make decisions for a patient. If the patient has not appointed a surrogate in an advance directive, close family members are ethically and legally empowered to make decisions for the patient.”).
49
See ABC News, YouTube, Mother of pregnant woman declared braindead and kept on life support speaks out (Dec. 23, 2025) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSxgOtD4B10&t=62s) [https://perma.cc/5YGR-LWL9] (April Newkirk explaining the hospital’s decision that, due to the heartbeat law, “he [Chance] was going to be treated as the patient, not Adriana.”).
50
See Ga. Code Ann. § 1-2-1(b), (d), (e)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2025 Sess.) (extending personhood rights to “unborn” children.)
51
See AMA Declaration of Professional Responsibility, Am. Med. Ass’n, https://www.ama-assn.org/public-health/prevention-wellness/ama-declaration-professional-responsibility [https://perma.cc/UWH9-AZMW] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026) (“We, the members of the world community of physicians, solemnly commit ourselves to: 1. Respect human life and the dignity of every individual.”).
52
See Shahd A. Karrar et al., Initial Antepartum Care, StatPearls Publ’g (Aug. 12, 2024) (noting that antepartum care aims to “optimize outcomes for both the mother and the fetus.”).
53
See generally Healthcare Ethics – Balancing Autonomy and Beneficence, Online Learning Coll. (Jan. 15, 2024), https://online-learning-college.com/knowledge-hub/care/healthcare-ethics-balancing-autonomy-beneficence [https://perma.cc/3TVU-D53G].
54
See Lubin, supra note 6.
55
H.R. Res. 522, 119th Cong. (2025).
56
See H Res 522, Fast Democracy, https://fastdemocracy.com/bill-search/us/119/bills/USB00096479 [https://perma.cc/ANR8-AQSR] (last visited Jan. 31, 2026).