“Revival” or Rip-Off: The Federal Government’s Use of Zach Bryan’s Hit Song

by Joshua Smith, Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 94

I. Introduction

The United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) used a song in a political advertisement that was written by country-folk singer-songwriter Zach Bryan during the summer of 2025.¹ Bryan, known for his independent approach to music production, did not grant permission for the use of his work.² The hit song, “Revival,” was featured in a commercial for the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (“ICE”) aimed at recruiting new agents.³

Following the unauthorized use of his music, Bryan released a teaser for an upcoming new single titled, “Bad News,” which used lyrics directly criticizing the Trump administration’s immigration policies.⁴ The release sparked immediate backlash from supporters of ICE’s agenda.⁵ In turn, DHS posted on social media platforms that Bryan should just “stick to Pink Skies,” a reference to another one of his most streamed songs.⁶

The use of “Revival” raises a novel legal and constitutional question that this Article seeks to explore. To what extent may the government appropriate or reference copyrighted works for public communication without violating either the Copyright Act of 1976 or the artist’s First Amendment rights to expressive control? Part II provides the legal background necessary to understand the tension between artistic control and government expression. This section begins by outlining the structure of the Copyright Act of 1976, with a focus on the exclusive rights of reproduction and public performance, as well as the constraints introduced by the fair use doctrine. Additionally, this section examines the evolution of the government speech doctrine and its constitutional implications, drawing on key cases such as Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., and Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum to illustrate the shifting landscape of state expression. Part III applies these legal principles to the federal government’s use of Bryan’s song. It evaluates whether the use might be justified as fair use or whether it constitutes unauthorized appropriation of copyrighted work. This Part further considers the potential First Amendment implications by examining whether artists have a right against compelled association when their music is used to promote government messaging. Finally, Part IV concludes by proposing a refined framework for assessing governmental use of copyrighted material and balancing the interests of public communication with the rights of creators.

II. Background

A. Copyright Act of 1976

The Copyright Act of 1976 (“Act”) established the foundational framework for modern copyright law in the United States.⁷ The statute grants authors of creative works a bundle of exclusive rights intended to protect their artistry from unauthorized use.⁸ Under the Act, a copyright holder possesses the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, display, and create derivative works based on the original creation.⁹ These rights serve not only to provide economic incentives for creators but also to safeguard their ability to control the integrity of their artistic expression.¹⁰

In the realm of music, these protections apply to both the musical composition itself and to the sound recording.¹¹ This dual-layered structure enables artists and publishers to retain control over how their work is performed, distributed, and publicly utilized.¹² When a government agency incorporates a musical work—such as Zach Bryan’s “Revival”—into a federal promotional video without prior authorization of the artist, such use may implicate several of these exclusive rights, particularly those of reproduction and public performance. Such conflicts highlight the balance between protecting creative ownership and accommodating broader governmental uses of artistic works.

However, the scope of these rights is not absolute. Copyright law deliberately limits the control granted to creators with safeguards designed to promote the broader public interest in access to creative expression. This balance lies at the core of the Act’s structure, which incorporates statutory limitations and exceptions, the most notable being the fair use doctrine. Through these mechanisms, the law seeks to reconcile the tension between protecting an artist’s creative autonomy and encouraging the sharing of cultural and informational works.

B. Fair Use Doctrine

The fair use doctrine functions as a limitation on the exclusive rights granted to authors, allowing certain uses of copyrighted works without the owner’s consent when those uses serve broader public interests such as free expression, commentary, and innovation.¹³ Codified as 17 U.S.C. § 107, the fair use doctrine outlines four non-exclusive factors that courts must consider: (i) the purpose and character of the use; (ii) the nature of the copyrighted work, (iii) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (iv) the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the original work.¹⁴ Each case must be evaluated individually, and a work’s usage must be assessed across all relevant factors.¹⁵

Courts often weigh the transformative nature—the degree to which a secondary use adds new expression, meaning, or message to the original work—against the potential market harm it may cause to the original. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that creative works—even parodies—may qualify as fair use if they add new expression, meaning, or message to the original.¹⁶ However, when a use simply reproduces a copyrighted work to support a separate message, particularly a governmental message, without meaningful transformation, the fair use defense becomes considerably weaker.¹⁷

C. Government Speech Doctrine

The government speech doctrine establishes that while the free speech clause of the First Amendment limits government regulation of private speech, it does not constrain the government when it speaks on its own behalf.¹⁸ Courts have carefully defined the boundaries of this doctrine, particularly when government expression involves private or copyrighted content.¹⁹ Two landmark Supreme Court cases—Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum and Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.—form the foundation of the doctrine.

In Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, the Court considered whether a city’s decision to accept one privately donated monument (a biblical display of the Ten Commandments) while rejecting another (offered by the Summum religious group) violated the First Amendment.²⁰ The Supreme Court held that the monument constituted government speech, meaning the city was free to select the messages it wished to convey without being compelled to accommodate all viewpoints.²¹ In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized several factors: (i) the long-standing tradition of governments using monuments to express ideas; (ii) the improbability that property owners, including governments, would host messages they do not endorse; and (iii) the government’s exercise of final approval authority over the monument’s display.²² This decision clarified that when the government conveys its own message, it is not subject to the viewpoint neutrality requirements that apply in traditional public forums.²³

Similarly, in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans Inc., the Supreme Court addressed whether Texas could deny a specialty license plate featuring the Confederate battle flag.²⁴ The Court ruled that license plates constitute government speech, as they are closely associated with state identity and messaging.²⁵ Applying the same factors used in Pleasant Grove City, Utah, the Court concluded that Texas had the discretion to reject designs inconsistent with its values.²⁶ Walker reaffirmed that the government is not required to maintain viewpoint neutrality when expressing its own messages and that the government retains broad discretion over the content it chooses to endorse through official channels.²⁷

Together, these cases underscore the principle that the government may make expressive choices without triggering full First Amendment scrutiny. However, the application of the government speech doctrine becomes more complex when the government’s message incorporates copyrighted material created by private individuals. Unlike license plates or monuments, musical works embody both economic and expressive value for their creators. This raises the unresolved question of whether such works, when used by the government, are fully shielded by the government speech doctrine, or whether the artist’s copyright and First Amendment interests impose limits on the government’s ability to appropriate and repurpose the content.

D. Defamation

Although the federal government enjoys broad immunity from defamation claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), the unauthorized use of an artist’s work in a politically charged or adversarial context can foster public perception that the artist endorses the government’s message.²⁸ In some contexts, this implied association may give rise to reputational harm and could support a defamation or false endorsement claim if it conveys a false implication or damages the artist’s public standing.²⁹

To establish defamation, a claimant must typically prove: (i) a false statement purporting to be fact, (ii) publication to a third party, (iii) fault amounting to at least negligence, and (iv) reputational harm.³⁰ In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court added that public figures must also demonstrate the act was done with “actual malice,” meaning a mental state demonstrating “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.”³¹ Mere negligence or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice.³² Celebrities and other individuals who have achieved fame or entered the public spotlight are generally considered public figures under this standard, and therefore bear a higher burden of proof in defamation cases.³³

While music is inherently expressive and not factual in nature, courts have recognized that false implications or unauthorized associations can support reputational claims under related torts such as the right of publicity or false endorsement. For example, in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., musician, Tom Waits, prevailed in a claim after his distinctive vocal style was imitated in a commercial, which misled listeners to believe he endorsed the product.³⁴ Similarly, in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit found liability where artist Bette Midler’s vocal likeness was used without consent in advertising that created the false impression of her endorsement.³⁵

Together, these cases illustrate that while the federal government is largely insulated from direct defamation claims, the unauthorized use of an artist’s identity or creative expression can still give rise to other related tort actions. Claims such as false endorsement, misappropriation, or violation of the right of publicity demonstrate how reputational and commercial harms may arise even in the absence of traditional defamation liability.

III. Discussion

A. Copyright Infringement Analysis

The unauthorized use of Zach Bryan’s song “Revival” by the federal government implicates the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners under the Act; specifically, the government’s reproduction and public performance of the song in an official promotional video likely falls within the scope of the artist’s protected rights.³⁶ ICE’s unlicensed and transformative advertisement raises the strong possibility that the use constitutes infringement.³⁷

Under the Act, infringement occurs when a party violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder without authorization.³⁸ In the context of music, courts have consistently recognized that both the composition and the sound recording are independently protected.³⁹ Moreover, the synchronization of music with audiovisual content typically requires explicit permission from the copyright owner.⁴⁰ Unauthorized use of copyrighted musical works in digital media, including by governmental entities, can give rise to liability under federal copyright law.⁴¹

Here, the government’s use of “Revival” served to accompany visual depictions of enforcement operations. The advertisement displayed ICE agents securing what was meant to portray undocumented immigrants, accompanied by Bryan’s lyrics playing in the background, “We’re having an all-night revival.”⁴² There is little indication that the use was transformative in nature—that is, that it added “new expression, meaning, or message”—to the original work.⁴³ Instead, the song’s expressive and emotional content was used to amplify the impact of the video, rather than to comment on, critique, or reinterpret the work itself.⁴⁴

As such, any fair use defense under the Act would likely be weakened, particularly in relation to the first and fourth Campbell factors¾the purpose of the use and its effect on the market for the original work. The government’s appropriation of the song could plausibly harm both the commercial value and reputational interests of Zach Bryan by associating his music with a federal campaign he neither authorized nor may support.

B. Fair Use Analysis

In Campbell, the Supreme Court articulated four fair use factors to be considered when assessing whether a particular use qualifies as fair use, striking a balance between the rights of copyright holders and the public interest.⁴⁵ Applying these factors to the government’s use of “Revival” reveals significant tension between public interest objectives and the artist’s legal rights.

First, the government’s purpose was promotional and informational, and intended to enhance the emotional resonance of a recruitment video.⁴⁶ While the use may not have been commercial in the traditional sense of generating direct profit, it served as a persuasive governmental function rather than providing commentary or criticism of the song itself. This non-transformative character weighs against a finding of fair use.⁴⁷ Second, “Revival” is a creative musical composition, and courts consistently have held that creative works merit strong protection under copyright law.⁴⁸ Unlike functional works, creative content is granted heightened protection, making unauthorized use more likely to be deemed infringing.⁴⁹ Third, the government used the song for at least a substantial and qualitatively significant portion for a meaningful segment of the video.⁵⁰ Courts have found that even partial use can weigh heavily against fair use when the portion used captures the “heart” of the original work.⁵¹ Finally, although the video was not sold for profit, the government’s use of the song could negatively affect its commercial value or alter public perception of the artists’ intended message.⁵² As Campbell noted, transformative use can mitigate market harm, but straightforward reproduction in service of government messaging does not offer such justification.⁵³ Taken together, these factors strongly suggest that the government’s use of “Revival” would not qualify for protection under fair use and would likely fail if challenged.⁵⁴

Applied to the government’s use of Zach Bryan’s “Revival,” these fair use factors reveal significant tension. The song was not used for commentary, criticism, or parody but rather to enhance the emotional resonance of an official government recruitment message for ICE agents.⁵⁵ Such a purpose arguably lacks transformative value and raises concerns about infringing on the artist’s exclusive right to control how his work is publicly associated and perceived.

C. Government Speech Doctrine and Its Limitations

The government speech doctrine, as articulated in Pleasant Grove City, Utah and Walker, grants the state broad discretion to communicate messages of its choosing.⁵⁶ However, this doctrine does not automatically shield the government from liability for copyright infringement claims.⁵⁷ When the government uses an artist’s work without authorization to advance its own message, copyright law, the artist’s expressive autonomy, and the right to control the context in which their work is presented are implicated.⁵⁸

Although the government may assert that its use of “Revival” is protected under the doctrine, courts may find that the expressive rights of the artist impose meaningful limits.⁵⁹ In cases involving privately created artistic works, the government’s status as a speaker does not inherently eliminate the legal obligation to obtain proper licenses or provide compensation to creators.⁶⁰ This creates a fundamental tension¾the government operates simultaneously as a speaker with sovereign communicative interests and as a regulator bound by intellectual property law.⁶¹ As such, conflicts may arise between the government’s desire to convey a particular message and the rights of private creators to control the use of their works.

D. Policy Considerations

Beyond the legal analysis, the incident between Bryan and DHS highlights a broader policy question: should the government be permitted to use copyrighted artistic works to advance its messaging without explicit authorization? The Act grants authors exclusive rights over reproduction, derivative works, distribution, and public performance. Courts have repeatedly recognized the strong protection afforded to creative works, particularly music, given their expressive and commercial value.⁶² Unauthorized government use of such works risks not only violating copyright law but also suppressing artistic autonomy, misrepresenting a creator’s views, and undermining the expressive control that copyright is designed to protect.⁶³

While some may argue that the government speech doctrine shields this kind of use, that defense traditionally applies in contexts such as license plates, monuments, or other official government communications, where state discretion in messaging is paramount.⁶⁴ Music, by contrast, is a privately authored expressive medium with both economic and reputational value.⁶⁵ Using an artist’s work without permission to promote government objectives implicates not only statutory copyright law but also the artist’s ability to control the context and associations of their work.⁶⁶ Such associations can alter the public’s perception of the work, the artist, and the government’s message itself.⁶⁷

One potential solution lies in the development of a clear legislative or regulatory framework governing the government’s use of copyrighted works.⁶⁸ This framework should include provisions for mandatory licensing and limitations on use in politically or socially sensitive contexts.⁶⁹ Such measures would allow the government to retain flexibility in public communication while safeguarding the economic, reputational, and expressive interests of creators.⁷⁰ In addition to respecting artists’ rights, statutory clarity would reduce litigation risk, enhance public trust, and prevent the perception that government messaging adopts or distorts private expression.⁷¹

In sum, striking a balance between the government’s communicative objectives and the rights of private creators is essential. Courts and policymakers must recognize that even persuasive non-commercial government uses of music or other creative works do not automatically qualify as fair use or fall entirely within the government speech doctrine exemption.⁷² Without explicit authorization, such uses not only expose the government to potential legal liability but also risk eroding both the integrity of public messaging and the autonomy of artistic expression.⁷³

E. Defamation

In addition to copyright and expressive concerns, the government’s use of Zach Bryan’s “Revival” raises the potential for reputational harm, implicating principles of defamation and false endorsement laws. The controversy intensified when DHS mocked Bryan’s song “Pink Skies” in an ICE recruitment social media post following the release of a teaser for his upcoming single “Bad News,” which directly criticized ICE operations and federal enforcement tactics.⁷⁴ The lyrics included lines such as, “ICE is gonna come bust down your door, try to build a house no one builds no more” and “I got some bad news, the fading of the red, white and blue.”⁷⁵

In Bryan’s case, the use of “Revival” in a federal immigration enforcement video, coupled with public mockery of “Pink Skies” by DHS, should reasonably imply a political alignment that contradicts Bryan’s clearly expressed opposition to ICE policies.⁷⁶ As a nationally recognized recording artist, Bryan would also likely be considered a public figure under New York Times Co., and therefore subject to the heightened “actual malice” standard in any defamation action.⁷⁷ Even if the government speech doctrine limits his ability to bring a successful defamation or false endorsement claim, the incident highlights the broader reputational, ethical, and expressive harms that can occur when the government uses an artist’s work without consent. These harms extend beyond economic interests because they implicate the artist’s creative autonomy, integrity, and public identity. Ultimately, the Bryan incident underscores the need for clearer legal safeguards to prevent government entities from appropriating artistic works in ways that distort meaning or suggest ideological alignment that the artist explicitly rejects.⁷⁸

IV. Conclusion

The federal government’s use of Zach Bryan’s “Revival” highlights the growing tension between artistic ownership and state expression in today’s media landscape. As government entities increasingly incorporate cultural and creative works into their public messaging, existing legal frameworks—particularly the Act and the government speech doctrine—struggle to account for the expressive and reputational interests of artists whose work is used without consent.

While traditional copyright law is designed to safeguard authors’ exclusive rights, it does not adequately address the unique harms that arise when the infringer is the state. The fair use doctrine provides flexibility, but not precision; it fails to consider the power imbalance between artists and government entities, as well as the chilling effect that unauthorized governmental use can impose on creative expression.⁷⁹ Similarly, the government speech doctrine, though grounded in constitutional principles, was not developed with the unauthorized use of private creative works in mind.⁸⁰ Its broad insulation from First Amendment scrutiny risks enabling the state to appropriate artistic expression while evading both copyright liability and meaningful public accountability.

This incident also underscores the reputational harm that can result from such unauthorized use. When an artist’s work is employed in a governmental or political context, it can create an implied association that distorts the artist’s intended message, undermines their credibility, and misleads the public about their views.⁸¹ These expressive and reputational injuries fall outside the scope of both copyright and defamation law, and reveal a critical gap in protection that modern legal analysis must confront.

Looking ahead, courts and policymakers should develop clearer limits on government use of copyrighted and expressive works. One approach would be to recognize a narrow exception to the government speech doctrine in cases where the state employs copyrighted works without authorization—requiring either a valid license or proof of transformative purpose.⁸² Alternatively, Congress should enact statutory safeguards for mandating attribution, consent, or compensation when artistic works are used in non-educational, non-editorial, or political communications.⁸³ Such reforms would not silence government speech but would ensure it speaks in a manner consistent with constitutional and ethical principles of authorship, integrity, and creative autonomy. As the boundaries between art, politics, and public communication continue to blur, protecting the rights of artists like Zach Bryan is essential to maintaining both artistic independence and the integrity of democratic discourse.

Cover Photo by Blake Harbison on Unsplash

Joshua Smith

References

1
Bill Donahue, Zach Bryan ‘ICE’ Video: Can He Sue Homeland Security?, Billboard Pro (Oct. 9, 2025), https://www.billboard.com/pro/zach-bryan-ice-video-can-he-sue-homeland-security-revival/ [https://perma.cc/EM4J-94TQ].
2
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3
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4
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Alexander Hall, DHS Trolls Zach Bryan by Using His Past Hit for Recruitment After He Teased Song Condemning ICE Raids, Fox News (Oct. 9, 2025), https://www.foxnews.com/media/dhs-trolls-zach-bryan-using-his-past-hit-recruitment-after-he-teased-song-condemning-ice-raids [https://perma.cc/H52U-F4Q7].
6
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7
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8
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
9
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11
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14
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15
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16
Id. at 570.
17
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20
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464-65 (2009).
21
Id. at 464.
22
Id. at 470-73.
23
Id. at 468.
24
Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 203 (2015).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 208.
27
Id. at 209.
28
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2018).
29
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 (A.L.I. 1977).
30
Id. at 558.
31
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
32
Id. at 263.
33
Id.
34
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992).
35
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
36
17 U.S.C. § 106(b) (2018).
37
See Hall, supra note 5.
38
17 U.S.C. § 501 (2018).
39
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41
Catherine S. Yao, Copyright Risks in the Digital Age: Persistent Challenges and Emerging Complexities, McLane Middleton (June 18, 2025), https://www.mclane.com/insights/copyright-risks-in-the-digital-age-persistent-challenges-and-emerging-complexities/ [https://perma.cc/NH7M-NZPC].
42
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43
Richard Stim & Glen Secor, Fair Use: What Is Transformative?, Nolo (June 30, 2023), https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/fair-use-what-transformative.html [https://perma.cc/RVS5-Y5ZH].
44
Hannah Dailey, DHS Taunts Zach Bryan by Using His Song in a Video Glorifying ICE: ‘We’re Having an All Night Revival’, Billboard (Oct. 8, 2025), https://www.billboard.com/music/music-news/zach-bryan-trolled-dhs-ice-video-using-his-song-1236084199/ [https://perma.cc/4BJB-Q7J3].
45
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
46
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
47
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81.
48
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
49
What Musicians Should Know About Copyright, supra note 39.
50
See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (even partial but qualitatively significant copying weighs against fair use).
51
Id.
52
Richard Stim & Glen Secor, Fair Use: What Is Transformative?, Nolo (June 30, 2023), https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/fair-use-what-transformative.html [https://perma.cc/RVS5-Y5ZH].
53
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-84 (1994)(discussing transformative use and market effect).
54
Fair Use Index, supra note 13.
55
Hall, supra note 5.
56
See generally Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2009); Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 210-11 (2015)(recognizing government discretion in communicating messages).
57
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
58
What Musicians Should Know About Copyright, supra note 39.
59
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-84 (1994)(explaining that transformative use affects fair use, but straightforward reproduction is not automatically excused).
60
17 U.S.C. §§ 102–106 (2018).
61
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984) (noting tensions between technological or governmental use and private property rights).
62
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
63
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting strong protection for creative musical works).
64
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2009); Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 210-11 (2015)(explaining the government’s discretion to communicate messages).
65
Catherine Jewell, Creating Value from Music – the Rights that Make it Possible, World Intell. Prop. Org. (Apr. 26, 2015), https://www.wipo.int/en/web/ipday/2015/creating_value_from_music [https://perma.cc/KW9Z-GDS2].
66
Fair Use Index, supra note 13.
67
Id.
68
Yao, supra note 41.
69
Id.
70
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
71
Id.
72
17 U.S.C. §§ 102–106 (2018).
73
Id.
74
Peter A. Berry, Zach Bryan Addresses Backlash Over His ICE Song, ABC News (Sept. 11, 2025), https://abcnews.go.com/US/love-country-zach-bryan-addresses-backlash-song-ice/story?id=126325347 [https://perma.cc/6YT3-EP35].
75
Zach Bryan, Bad News (lyrics), Genius, https://genius.com/Zach-bryan-bad-news-lyrics [https://perma.cc/6B3U-KCP4].
76
Berry, supra note 74.
77
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
78
Yao, supra note 41.
79
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
80
See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 200 (2015); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 460 (2009)
81
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
82
Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Their Works, 30 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J., 81 (1989).
83
Mark Strasser, Government Speech and Circumvention of the First Amendment, 44 Hastings Const. L.Q. 37 (2016).