by Brett Blair, Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 93
I. Introduction
For 40 years, the Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council decision shaped how courts reviewed agency decisions and regulations.[1] Chevron required courts to defer to agency interpretations for ambiguities in federal statutes.[2] This framework governed administrative law until last year, when the Supreme Court handed down the landmark ruling in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,[3] which required courts to exercise their judgment when analyzing the meaning of statutory provisions, marking a significant “shift in the nature of judicial review” that will usher in greater scrutiny of agency actions than existed under Chevron.[4]
However, Loper Bright further held that prior cases that had applied Chevron deference should be undisturbed, and the agencies’ statutory interpretations in those cases should remain authoritative precedents.[5] Loper Bright’s command to lower courts is relatively straightforward. If there is a binding precedent on an issue, that precedent applies and should be followed. But we have already seen lower courts unable to resist the temptation to take their new powers out for a spin and give their interpretation of an ambiguous statute in the face of a binding precedent.[6] This ruling puts courts in a challenging position, requiring them to resist the temptation to substitute their own interpretations and instead apply precedent under Chevron, thereby maintaining the longstanding interpretations of statutes and regulations that have historically been used.
This article explores the development of statutory interpretation in administrative law, culminating new efforts to apply the principles outlined in Loper Bright. Part II provides background on interpreting statutory ambiguities, including the principles outlined in Chevron. In addition, Part II highlights the recent difficulties of courts in balancing the competing concepts of applying precedent under Chevron or taking steps toward independent interpretation of statutes by courts. Part III discusses the issues present in the development of recent frameworks, created under the guidance of Loper Bright, to interpret statutes and regulations in a post-Chevron world. Part IV offers a brief conclusion explaining why the current frameworks created under cases like Moctezuma-Reyes are unworkable, creating the need for courts to revisit a proper application of Loper Bright.
II. Background
Loper Bright reshaped administrative law in ways that the judiciary is still struggling to navigate.[7] With one stroke of the pen, Loper Bright upended 40 years of precedent that was a centerpiece of administrative law.[8] To properly understand the dilemma courts are battling with following Loper Bright, it is crucial to know how administrative law has developed since the 1980s. After walking through the shifts and changes that have taken place in this area of the law, this section will further analyze a recent attempt by the Sixth Circuit to apply Loper Bright. This section will then examine the Sixth Circuit’s impractical approach to statutory interpretation, developed in the wake of Loper Bright, setting the stage for a discussion on why revisiting Loper Bright to clarify its holding is essential.
A. Deference Under Chevron
In 1984, the Supreme Court created Chevron deference when it issued its ruling in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.[9] At its root, Chevron deference stands for the idea that government agencies are best suited to offer interpretations of ambiguous federal statutes and regulations, so long as the interpretation is a reasonable one.[10] This principle rests on the notion that government agencies, with their specialized expertise, are better equipped than courts to interpret ambiguous federal statutes and, therefore, should be allowed to advance their interpretations to achieve a more accurate understanding of the meaning of a statute.[11]
In Chevron, the Court explained that the first step of the reviewing court’s analysis should be focused on examining a statute to determine whether there is ambiguity.[12] This is an inherently subjective analysis, as evidenced by EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.’s decisions in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the Supreme Court.[13] In the D.C. Circuit, Judge Kavanaugh’s majority opinion expresses the notion that the involved statute was clearly not ambiguous, and there was sufficient statutory context to understand the limitations of the statute.[14] However, in the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion interpreted the same statute as being ambiguous, and thus the Court held that that Congress had delegated authority to the EPA to interpret such ambiguities.[15]
Under the principles of Chevron, once a court has deemed a statute to be ambiguous, it must then determine whether to defer to agency interpretations of the ambiguity.[16] In doing so, the Court determined that “if a reviewing court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its construction of the statute.”[17] The Court stated that administrative agencies should formulate policies and regulations to fill any gaps left by Congress, whether implicit or explicit.[18] In such cases, the reviewing court should not disturb the regulations unless they are deemed arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute.[19] Similarly, when Congress has implicitly left such a gap, agencies are then deemed to have the authority to fill that gap with their reasonable interpretation.[20]
The Court supported this position with the premise that judges are not experts in every fields, and are not able to apply the incumbent administration’s views of policymaking in informing their judgments.[21] Agencies, however, can use their expertise, along with the incumbent administration’s political positions, to reasonably resolve competing interests that are created when Congress leaves ambiguity in a federal statute.[22] As a result, the concept of Chevron deference was born and persisted for the next 40 years.[23]
B. Loper Bright Offers a New Method of Interpretation
Recently, Chevron came under attack, as critics urged that it violated Article III of the U.S. Constitution which the Court, in Marbury v. Madison, interpreted as giving federal courts the power to say what the law is.[24] Many critics believed the Chevron doctrine gave federal agencies too much power in determining the appropriate interpretation of the law.[25] Justice Scalia even argued that “[t]oo many important decisions of the Federal Government are made nowadays by unelected agency officials exercising broad lawmaking authority.”[26] Ultimately, those opposing Chevron believed the executive branch was able to exert too much influence over the meaning of statutory law, interpreting ambiguities in a manner that aligns with its desired policies.[27] These criticisms came to a head when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Loper Bright, which was decided in June 2024.[28]
In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) required courts to use their own judgment in interpreting whether an administrative agency had acted within its statutory authority, rather than deferring to the agency’s interpretation of the law in light of an ambiguous statute.[29] In analyzing the matter, the Court determined that the views of the executive branch can inform the judgment of the judiciary, but they cannot supersede it.[30] Ultimately, it is the role of the judiciary to say what the law is under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.[31] This concept of allowing the judiciary to exercise independent judgment to resolve questions of statutory interpretation was codified in Section 706 of the APA, which requires that reviewing courts “decide all relevant questions of law” in their efforts to interpret statutory provisions.[32] The Court determined that both the text of the APA and the history of its application, support the notion that courts are not required to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, which is directly opposed to the holding in Chevron.[33]
The Court further explained that courts are not relieved of their interpretive duties when a statute is deemed to have some sort of ambiguity.[34] Such ambiguity does not represent a delegation of interpretive authority to any agency.[35] Rather, all statutes contain a “best meaning” that is fixed at the time of enactment.[36] It is thus the job of courts to find this “best meaning” using all relevant interpretive tools.[37] As a result, the Loper Bright Court parts with the Chevron Court, proclaiming that Chevron erred in permitting agencies to develop “permissible” interpretations of a statute, so long as those interpretations were reasonable.[38] The Court instead asserted that there can be no “permissible” interpretations of a statute, seeing as the “best meaning” of the statute is that which a court concludes is best.[39] The dissent in Loper Bright criticized this position and argued that “[a] rule of judicial humility gives way to a rule of judicial hubris.”[40] In doing so, the dissent expressed the opinion that the Court improperly assumed interpretive authority that should be held by knowledgeable agencies.[41]
The Biden Administration took the position in Loper Bright that Congress must have intended for courts to defer to agencies in resolving ambiguities due to the subject matter expertise that they hold regarding the statutes that they administer.[42] The Government contended that the process of resolving statutory ambiguities involved policymaking that was “best left to political actors, rather than courts.”[43] The Court explained that this should not be a concern, seeing as interpreting technical details within a statute is, and has been, the “ordinary diet of the law.”[44] Justice Roberts contended that courts undertook technical statutory interpretation “without issue” before the Chevron decision.[45] As a result, the Court overruled Chevron and held that courts must follow the requirements of the APA by exercising independent judgment in deciding whether a given agency has acted within its statutory authority.[46] The Court noted that any prior cases that had applied Chevron deference to the statutory interpretations of an agency would remain authoritative precedent.[47]
The holding in Loper Bright has significant implications for administrative law.[48] The ruling imposes the responsibility on courts to supply interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, even in instances where scientific or technical expertise may be involved.[49] The holding further limits the ability of federal agencies to use their expertise to fill in gaps in the law or to address those situations that may not have been anticipated by Congress at the promulgation of a statute.[50] In addition, the holding ultimately places added pressure on Congress to either draft statutes with a greater level of specificity or to make express delegations of interpretative authority, seeing as courts will now carry the responsibility for imposing their judgment in the absence of clarity.[51]
In overruling Chevron, the Court has left administrative law without a clear or specific direction forward.[52] Loper Bright offers no clear standard for lower courts to apply in resolving any uncertainty left over after traditional tools of statutory construction have been exhausted.[53] As a result, courts are operating in a twilight zone and are on their own in determining the best manner to interpret ambiguous statutes.[54]
C. Application of Loper Bright in Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland
The lack of direction offered by Loper Bright has been on display as lower courts attempt to navigate such an unclear administrative space. As more courts begin to apply Loper Bright, difficulties arise in just how to apply such a broad, sweeping holding. Such issues were especially present in the Sixth Circuit’s recent ruling in Moctezuma-Reyes.[55]
In Moctezuma-Reyes, the The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered the proper interpretation of the term “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” in an immigration context.[56] The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the petitioner in 2018.[57] The petitioner applied for cancellation of his removal from the United States due to the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship that he claimed would be experienced by his family if he were to be deported.[58] For the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the petitioner’s removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), as empowered by Congress, the petitioner would have had to prove four factors, the last of which requires that the petitioner “establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”[59]
Both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed that the petitioner’s case did not satisfy the fourth factor.[60] The central issue in this case concerned the Sixth Circuit’s decision to either defer to the BIA’s interpretation of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” or to articulate its understanding of the phrase.[61] The Sixth Circuit developed a two-part test for assessing whether to give deference to an agency’s interpretation under Loper Bright.[62] The court held that unless a statute contains both broad language and judgment-conferring language, interpretive authority is not conveyed to the administrative agency, and thus no deference is afforded to its interpretation of the statute.[63] The delegation of authority to the agency on both prongs of the test must be very clear for the deference to apply in the absence of the Chevron doctrine.[64]
In applying its two-part test, the Sixth Circuit conceded that the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” constitutes the presence of broad language, satisfying the first prong.[65] However, the second prong required a grant of authority that explicitly empowers the agency to exercise judgment in interpreting the statute.[66] The Sixth Circuit determined that such language was not present in the statute.[67] The Sixth Circuit held that while the language of the statute affords the BIA the ability to cancel removal proceedings if an alien is eligible for cancellation, there is no language in the statute that gave the BIA interpretive power in determining whether the alien was eligible for removal in the first place, despite permissive language appearing in other parts of the statute.[68] As a result, the court took it upon itself to independently determine the meaning of the statute’s “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard.[69]
In doing so, the court considered the dictionary definitions of the terms “exceptional,” “unusual,” and “extreme” using Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary.[70] The court used these definitions to inform its understanding of the meaning of each word, then applied such to the overall meaning of the phrase in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).[71] This process resembled the process undertaken by the Court in San Francisco v. EPA, where the Court entered into a battle of dictionaries.[72] In this battle, the majority and dissenting opinions cited various provisions and editions of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, and the Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary to develop the meaning of various statutory words and phrases.[73]
After gathering dictionary definitions of the relevant terms, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis determined that the baseline for comparison of hardship should be all deportations.[74] Thus, to satisfy the standard, a hardship must be exceptional and extremely unusual in light of other deportations.[75] The factors cited by the petitioner, including “the loss of financial prospects, separation from loved ones, and reduced educational opportunities” were deemed by the court to fall squarely within the realm of what could be expected in other deportations.[76] As a result, the Sixth Circuit held that, based on its interpretation of the statute, the petitioner’s situation did not rise to the level required by the statute for cancellation of removal proceedings.[77] It is yet to be seen whether this two-part test will gain a wider following as more courts start to interpret Loper Bright.[78]
D. Concurring Opinion in Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland
Judge Stranch’s concurring opinion in Moctezuma-Reyes took a slightly different approach to analyzing the issues at hand.[79] To begin, Judge Stranch took the position that the Sixth Circuit should not have used this case to deal with the issue of BIA’s discretion in interpreting the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” seeing as neither party had raised the issue or argued it.[80] Judge Stranch felt strongly that the Sixth Circuit should have only taken up this issue once the relevant parties had the opportunity to present their arguments regarding the appropriate criteria for cancellation of removal, which could inform the court’s statutory interpretation of the phrase.[81]
In addition, Judge Stranch’s concurrence stressed the idea that Loper Bright does not give courts the power to redefine statutory terms from a new cloth and instead urged that statutory reinterpretation should be undertaken with “great caution.”[82] Judge Stranch further argued that the Supreme Court has set forth case law that enforces the BIA’s test for “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” in what is known as the Monreal-Aguinaga test.[83] Seeing as this case law is an authoritative precedent, Judge Stranch advocated for the idea that even Loper Bright would not support the upending of such.[84] Finally, Judge Stranch proclaimed that Loper Bright instructs courts to use the statutory interpretations of agencies to inform their own, which she argued the Sixth Circuit has failed to do by impermissibly conducting its statutory interpretation without regard to the BIA’s longstanding agency precedent.[85] Though Judge Stranch believed the Sixth Circuit improperly used this case as a vehicle for litigating the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” test, she concurred in the judgment, stating that the petitioner would have failed to meet the criteria for cancellation under the old test as well.[86]
III. Discussion
The Sixth Circuit’s attempt to apply Loper Bright in its recent decision in Moctezuma-Reyes is illustrative of the broad and vaguely defined administrative law environment that Loper Bright has created. By removing Chevron deference, while still attempting to apply Chevron-based precedent, Loper Bright offers lower courts little guidance in how to apply the principles of its holding. In doing so, it opens the door for lower courts to take a more individualized role in statutory interpretation, which could have dangerous effects on the field of administrative law. The Supreme Court should ultimately take an active approach to resolving these issues by revisiting and clarifying the holding in Loper Bright, and establishing clear, uniform standards for lower courts to follow in applying it.
A. Could We Restore Chevron? Should We?
As more courts begin to apply the principles outlined in Loper Bright, a question arises as to whether the Supreme Court should return Chevron deference or continue down the path that Loper Bright paves. In addition, further questions arise as to Congress’s ability to force this change by amending the APA. As previously noted, many scholars criticized Chevron on the principle that the decision takes away the courts’ constitutional authority, as interpreted by Marbury v. Madison, to say what the law is.[87] However, Justice Roberts’s opinion in Loper Bright avoided a full constitutional attack on Chevron deference, and instead interpreted the APA in a manner that did not require courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions.[88] In doing so, Justice Roberts may have inadvertently left the door open for Congress to restore Chevron deference by amending the APA to command courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions.
In that situation, the question for Congress turns on whether Loper Bright is unworkable and whether restoration of Chevron is necessary. Despite the long reign of Chevron, the Court’s decision in Loper Bright offers useful changes for administrative law. As previously noted, the Chevron Court grounded its position on the premise that federal agencies have a higher level of expertise in their respective fields and can also apply the incumbent administration’s views of policymaking to inform their judgments.[89] If agencies can apply the incumbent administration’s policymaking views, the meaning of federal statutes could change every time the White House changes occupants. As a result, consistency within administrative law falls by the wayside in favor of an ever-changing legal environment. To a degree, Loper Bright addressed this problem by assigning courts the power to determine the meaning of ambiguous federal statutes, rather than allowing agencies to alter the interpretation of such every four years.[90] Thus, a return to Chevron deference is not necessary. Loper Bright holds the potential to create both a predictable and consistent environment for administrative law, though it has several issues that the Court must seek to address.
B. The Impossible Pursuit for “One Best Meaning”
A key flaw present in Loper Bright’s holding is the insistence that courts should find the “one best meaning” that it claims is fixed in all statutes at the time of enactment.[91] Loper Bright claims that this “one best meaning” is the meaning that courts give to an ambiguous statute after using all relevant interpretive tools.[92] Among these tools is the use of dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of the words in a statute. One must only glance at the debates between justices in cases like Moctezuma-Reyes and San Francisco v. EPA to realize how ridiculous the notion of “one best meaning” truly is.[93] If judges cannot even agree on the proper edition of a dictionary to use in assessing the meaning of ambiguous words and phrases, it is difficult to believe that a true best meaning exists for federal statutes. Reasonable minds can attribute vastly different interpretations to ambiguities within statutory words and phrases. Similarly, engaging in a battle of the dictionaries is a poor method of conducting statutory interpretation, seeing as stark differences exist among brands and editions, leaving administrative law in an unstable state. As a result, Loper Bright commands courts to ignore agency interpretations in pursuit of a “best meaning” that does not exist in the real world.
C. Loper Bright’s Vagueness Will Lead Courts to Disregard Well-Founded Precedent
As evidenced by Moctezuma-Reyes, the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright could also mistakenly lead lower courts to ignore longstanding legal precedent in favor of asserting their own interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions.[94] The Sixth Circuit’s majority opinion jumps at the opportunity to create its interpretation of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, altogether ignoring the Monreal-Aguinaga test that had previously been enforced by the Supreme Court and had previously been applied by the Sixth Circuit.[95]
The Sixth Circuit’s decision strays away from the teachings of Loper Bright, which makes clear that courts should be cautious in undertaking statutory reinterpretation, especially in cases where a common agency-based interpretation have been regularly applied.[96] In seeking to pave its path of statutory interpretation, the Sixth Circuit essentially throws out relevant and regularly applied precedent, stretching Loper Bright’s holding far beyond that which the Supreme Court has set forth. This presents a clear danger of Loper Bright’s holding that could ultimately lead to serious unintentional consequences for Chevron-based precedent if left unaddressed.
D. Loper Bright Opens the Door to Vast Inconsistency
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Moctezuma-Reyes demonstrates the main issues created by Loper Bright. Ultimately, Loper Bright overrules the Chevron doctrine, doing away with the requirement that courts defer to the statutory interpretations of agencies in deciding statutory ambiguities.[97] The decision assigns the judiciary responsibility to exercise independent judgment in selecting interpretive methods for addressing statutory ambiguities.[98] However, Loper Bright also holds that the precedent case law created under the Chevron doctrine is to remain in place, and has not yet been overruled, creating a dilemma for courts in determining how to apply its holding.
Loper Bright ultimately offers little to no guidance to lower courts in determining when they must exercise independent judgment in statutory interpretation, and when the precedent under Chevron must be applied. As a result, lower courts are left to make this determination on their own, which could lead to very inconsistent rulings and certainly inconsistent statutory interpretation. If other circuits follow the Sixth Circuit’s lead, administrative law will no longer function as a coherent body of precedent, but rather as a collection of competing judicial interpretations, each with its inconsistent methodology. As a direct result of this inconsistency, regulatory uncertainty is likely to increase, which will limit the ability of businesses to confidently rely on agency pronouncements.[99] The majority opinion in Loper Bright dismisses uniformity as being a valid reason to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.[100] However, businesses and individuals cannot conform to the requirements of the law if such requirements are so unclear from state to state, even to the courts that interpret them.
This need for clarity motivated Judge Stranch’s concurrence in the Moctezuma-Reyes case, where she argued that statutory reinterpretation should be undertaken with “great caution.”[101] By creating inconsistency within administrative law, orchestrated through the disregard of precedent in favor of a court’s own interpretation, Loper Bright essentially creates an environment in which the same federal statute is interpreted and applied in wildly different ways, based on the reviewing court. Such a system cuts against all principles of fairness that should be expected within a legal system, instead applying the rule of law in a manner that is subject to the whims of those sitting on the reviewing court.
E. The Sixth Circuit’s Test Opens the Door to Eradicating Deference Entirely
Absent a clear standard for determining when to apply precedent deference in statutory interpretation, the Sixth Circuit took it upon itself to create its deference test.[102] As discussed, this test involved first considering whether a statute contains broad language and then considering whether the language in the statute could be seen as conferring interpretive authority to a governmental agency.[103] Without satisfying both elements, no deference shall be awarded.[104]
This test has issues. It is ultimately unworkable and will likely prove to be nearly impossible to satisfy. Most statutes, especially those that applied Chevron deference, are not likely to have such clear language, delegating interpretive authority over broad language to specific agencies. Under Chevron, the general understanding was that courts would defer to agencies to fill in both the explicit and implicit gaps in statutes issued by Congress during this period.[105] Thus, without a clear delegation of authority, which most statutes lacked under Chevron’s reign, courts will immediately go to the next step of the Sixth Circuit’s test, which involves exercising independent judgment in interpreting statutory provisions.
This proposed interpretive methodology completely ignores Loper Bright’s insistence that the precedental case law developed under Chevron continues to be applied by introducing additional requirements that are sure to prevent such precedents from being applicable. By essentially creating a loophole that will avoid the application of Chevron-based precedent in cases where a clear delegation of authority is not present, the Sixth Circuit might as well be setting aside Loper Bright’s insistence that Chevron-based precedent has not been overruled.
To illustrate this point, it is noteworthy that the majority opinion in Moctezuma-Reyes cites provisions of the Clean Air Act, which was enacted in 1970, as evidence of a statute with a clear delegation of interpretive authority to certain agencies, namely the Environmental Protection Agency.[106] Before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron in 1984, it was more common for Congress to explicitly delegate interpretive authority to agencies, seeing as case law did not provide a clear understanding that they would have this authority otherwise.[107] Chevron changed this concept by creating an administrative state that assumed deference to agency interpretation in the event a court deemed a statute to be ambiguous.[108] Because of this assumption, Congress did not typically offer an explicit delegation of interpretive authority to agencies when it promulgated new statutes following Chevron, seeing as it was already understood that agencies had the could fill this gap.[109]
Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s test works around Loper Bright’s reassurance that Chevron-based precedent should still be applied by creating that standard that virtually eradicates agency deference in any capacity. In the absence of explicit congressional delegation of interpretive authority to agencies within precedent, cases decided under Chevron, the Sixth Circuit’s test will impose a duty on courts to assert their own interpretations of ambiguous statutes. This will result in a situation where courts never defer to agency interpretations in any capacity, which stands contrary to Loper Bright. The Sixth Circuit’s misapplication of Loper Bright’s holding is clear evidence of why the Court should revisit it to clarify how lower courts should apply it.
IV. Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Moctezuma-Reyes highlights several key issues regarding the vagueness that is expressed in the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright. Ultimately, Loper Bright has not provided the lower courts with workable standards to apply its holding. This will lead to very inconsistent applications of Loper Bright in the lower courts, creating a highly unstable and irregular state of federal administrative law. As a result, there is an urgent need for the Supreme Court to revisit its holding in Loper Bright to provide a clearer picture for lower courts regarding the proper application of its holding. Without this, lower courts will continue to rely on their own efforts in developing tests that may or may not work well to serve the ends that Loper Bright sought to achieve in revamping administrative law as we know it.
[1] Varu Chilalamarri et al., The End of Chevron Deference: What The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Loper-Bright Means for Regulated Community, K&L Gates (June 28, 2024), https://www.klgates.com/The-End-of-Chevron-Deference-What-the-Supreme-Courts-Ruling-in-Loper-Bright-Means-for-the-Regulated-Community-6-28-2024 [https://perma.cc/Y6PG-BDTH]; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
[2] Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
[3] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
[4] Chilalamarri, supra note 1.
[5] Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412.
[6] See e.g. Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024).
[7] Chilalamarri, supra note 1.
[8] Id.
[9] Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
[10] Christina Pazzanese, ‘Chevron Deference’ Faces Existential Test, The Harvard Gazette (Jan. 16, 2024), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2024/01/chevron-deference-faces-existential-test/#:~:text=Chevron%20says%2C%20if%20Congress%20has,agency’s%20reasonable%20reading%20should%20govern [https://perma.cc/953J-Z36L].
[11] Id.
[12] Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
[13] EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (2012), rev’d and remanded, 572 U.S. 489 (2014); EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014).
[14] EME Homer v. EPA, 696 F.3d at 28.
[15] EPA v. EME Homer, 572 U.S. at 513.
[16] Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at 844.
[20] Id.
[21] Id. at 865.
[22] Id.
[23] Pazzanese, supra note 10.
[24] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
[25] Pazzanese, supra note 10.
[26] EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[27] Pazzanese, supra note 10.
[28] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024).
[29] Id. at 382-386.
[30] Id. at 386-387.
[31] Id. at 384-385.
[32] Id. at 391.
[33] Id. at 393-395.
[34] Id. at 400-401.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Id.
[40] Id. at 450 (Kagan. J., dissenting).
[41] Id. at 451 (Kagan. J., dissenting)..
[42] Id.
[43] Id. at 400.
[44] Id. at 401-402.
[45] Id.
[46] Id. at 412-413.
[47] Id.
[48] Paul Hemmersbaugh and Smantha Chaifetz, Chevron Overruled: In Loper Bright v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court Reshapes the Regulatory Landscape, DLA Piper (June 28, 2024), https://www.dlapiper.com/en-us/insights/publications/2024/06/chevron-overruled-in-loper-bright-v-raimondo [https://perma.cc/B7PK-N9RR].
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Id.
[53] Id.
[54] Id.
[55] Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024).
[56] Id. at 420.
[57] Id. at 419.
[58] Id. at 419-20.
[59] Id. at 419.
[60] Id.
[61] Id. at 420.
[62] Stephen Obermeier et al, 6th Circ. Ruling Paves Out of Loper Bright ‘Twilight Zone,’ Law 360 (Mar. 12, 2025), https://www.wiley.law/media/publication/628_Law360%20-%206th%20Circ.%20Ruling%20Paves%20Path%20Out%20Of%20Loper%20Bright%20_Twilight%20Zone_.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GP5-9J57].
[63] Id.
[64] Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 421.
[65] Id. at 420.
[66] Id.
[67] Id.
[68] Id. at 421.
[69] Id.
[70] Id.
[71] Id. at 422.
[72] City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 145 S. Ct. 704 (2025).
[73] Id.
[74] Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422.
[75] Id.
[76] Id.
[77] Id. at 424.
[78] Obermeier, supra note 62.
[79] Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 424-25 (Stranch. J., concurring).
[80] Id. at 424 (Stranch. J., concurring).
[81] Id.
[82] Id.
[83] Id.
[84] Id.
[85] Id. at 425 (Stranch. J., concurring).
[86] Id.
[87] Pazzanese, supra note 10.
[88] Loper Bright Enters. V. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 393-395 (2024).
[89] Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
[90] Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 400-401.
[91] Id.
[92] Id.
[93] See Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024); City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 145 S. Ct. 704 (2025).
[94] Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 424.
[95] Id.
[96] Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412-413.
[97] Id.
[98] Id.
[99] Hemmersbaugh, supra note 48.
[100] Loper Bright, 603 U.S. 401-402.
[101] Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 424 (6th Cir. 2024).
[102] Obermeier, supra note 62.
[103] Id.
[104] Id.
[105] Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
[106] Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 420.
[107] See e.g. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
[108] Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
[109] Id.
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