by Brett Blair, Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 93
I. Introduction
Until the LIV Golf Tour (“LIV”) came onto the scene in 2021, the Professional Golfers’ Association Tour (“PGA Tour”) dominated the North American golf scene for both players and fans.[1] When LIV emerged, it sought to attract many high-profile golf professionals from the PGA Tour through a revised structure of play and lucrative pay structures.[2] This led to a rocky relationship between the two organizations; one in which the PGA sought to retain their golfers by suspending anyone that left the PGA Tour in favor of joining LIV.[3] These actions, along with the PGA Tour’s more recent willingness to negotiate a merger with LIV, have placed the PGA Tour under fire for potential antitrust violations due to its anticompetitive nature.[4]
This article explores the potential antitrust challenges and issues that may arise from the proposed merger of the PGA Tour and LIV. Part II provides background on the emergence of LIV into the golf industry, along with a brief history of the relationship between the PGA Tour and LIV. Part III discusses antitrust issues that will likely arise because of the proposed merger between the PGA Tour and LIV, as well as how this relates to previous litigation between the parties. Part IV offers a brief conclusion on how these potential antitrust issues can be expected to impact the proposed merger of the PGA Tour and LIV.
II. Background
To properly understand the relationship between the PGA Tour and LIV, along with the subsequent antitrust legal issues involved with their actions, it is necessary to dive into how the entrance of LIV to the golf industry changed the market. LIV’s extensive pocketbook, along with its newly designed format for golf tournaments, created a significant amount of competition within the industry the PGA Tour had long dominated.[5] As a result, many golfers formerly associated with the PGA Tour sought new opportunities with LIV.[6] The strained relationship that ensued between the two entities led to actions that have since fallen under the purview of antitrust law.[7] After illustrating LIV’s entrance into the golf market, this section will further analyze the development of the relationship between the two entities since 2021, setting up the discussion of any potential antitrust violations that exist in the recent efforts of the two entities to merge.
A. The Entrance of LIV into the Golf Industry
LIV’s entrance into the market in 2021 disrupted the PGA Tour’s monopoly over golf in North America.[8] Backed by the Saudi Arabian government’s Public Investment Fund, LIV entered the field with the goal of positioning themselves to compete with the PGA Tour for the top talent in the world.[9] Many players, such as Phil Mickelson and Dustin Johnson, saw LIV as being able to offer benefits that exceeded those offered by the PGA Tour.[10] Phil Mickelson, for example, was very open in his efforts to endorse LIV.[11] He believed LIV would pay golfers the money they rightly deserved, yet were being denied due to the PGA Tour’s “obnoxious greed.”[12] LIV felt it could capitalize upon these perceived differences to create greater competition in the golf sphere.[13]
From the moment the first tee shot was struck in a LIV event, the style of play was very different from the PGA Tour.[14] LIV offers shorter tournaments, hosting events consisting of only 54 holes of golf, as opposed to the 72 holes played in PGA Tour events.[15] In addition, LIV events do not require golfers to make a cut to move on to the next round.[16] Rather, golfers are guaranteed to play in all three rounds of a LIV tournament, leading to a smaller field of players than their PGA Tour counterparts.[17]
LIV events contain a player field of 48 players grouped into 12 teams of four members.[18] New teams are drafted by designated team captains for each LIV event.[19] The team aspect of the LIV structure, not typically present on the PGA Tour, creates another avenue by which players can earn money: through team performance.[20] By enabling golfers to earn additional money based on team performance, golfers have a chance to take home substantial earnings, even during weeks in which their individual play may not be the best among the field.[21] This is closely connected to one of the most substantial differences between the LIV structure and the PGA Tour: payouts.[22]
LIV events are known for having a purse that dwarfs that of the PGA Tour.[23] Higher prize pools and smaller player fields mean that, for LIV events, golfers are guaranteed some earnings merely by entering the field.[24] LIV events carry an overall pot of $25 million, $20 million of which counts toward the individual competition and $5 million of which counts toward the team competition.[25] In fact, the last place finisher in the individual competition is still guaranteed to earn a minimum of $120,000 for their efforts, absent additional earnings for team success.[26] LIV players also sign exorbitant contracts to become part of the LIV organization, with players like Jon Rahm earning as much as $300 million from his contract alone.[27] These lucrative contracts aided LIV in poaching players from the PGA Tour.[28] Using these incentives, along with the above-named benefits and tournaments structures, LIV has successfully cemented themselves as a key player within the golf industry.[29]
B. Tensions Rise Between the PGA Tour and LIV
As LIV began to uproot the monopoly that the PGA Tour had long held within the golf industry, tensions began to rise between the two organizations.[30] Especially from the outset, many PGA Tour members and fans spoke out against those golfers accepting deals with LIV on the basis that the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund used to fund its operation had long been accused of using sports and entertainment investments to distract from various human rights abuses.[31] This is known as sportswashing, where a political actor attempts to use the broad appeal of sports to direct public attention away from unethical conduct.[32]
Aside from its opposition to sportswashing, the PGA Tour generally feels that it should be free from the overreach of LIV Golf.[33] The PGA Tour has expressed disdain for LIV, arguing that LIV is interfering with the business of the PGA by offering its players lucrative sums of money to break their PGA contracts, essentially skimming the cream from professional golf.[34] The PGA Tour, along with much of the world, has long viewed itself as the mecca of golf.[35] In fact, prominent golfers, like Tiger Woods, have argued that the prominence of the PGA Tour is what allowed modern-day professional golfers to reach the positions they have today.[36] Many golfers see the PGA Tour as developing elite golfers who are then poached by LIV for more money.[37]
One of the most prominent critics of LIV is Rory McIlroy.[38] McIlroy has not shied away from expressing his hatred of LIV, explaining that he believes it is only harming the game of golf, rather than growing it.[39] In fact, McIlroy went so far as to say, “[i]f LIV Golf was the last place to play golf on Earth, I would retire.”[40] McIlroy has consistently stood strong in his view that LIV golfers were “taking the easy way out” by choosing large sums of money over the prestige and tradition presented by the PGA Tour.[41]
The PGA Tour did not take kindly to the active poaching of their members.[42] Following the inaugural LIV Golf event, PGA Tour commissioner Jay Monahan suspended all participants, barring them from PGA Tour events for violating its Tournament Regulations.[43] This also meant that golfers who defected to LIV would be removed from the FedEx Cup points list, a key component used in determining who can qualify to be on a country’s Ryder Cup team.[44] The DP World Tour, formally known as the European Tour, enacted a similar ban on LIV golfers, citing various concerns regarding the disruptive role of LIV in the golf sphere.[45] This concept did not sit well for golfers like Phil Mickelson, who argued that he had a lifetime membership with the PGA Tour that he had worked hard to earn.[46]
C. Tensions Reach a Boiling Point
Tensions between the PGA Tour, DP World Tour, and LIV reached a boiling point in August of 2022.[47] At that time, a group of eleven LIV golfers, led by Mickelson, filed an antitrust lawsuit against the PGA Tour.[48] In addition to other remedies under antitrust law, the complaint sought a temporary restraining order that would allow the golfers to participate in the PGA Tour’s FedEx Cup Playoffs. The complaint alleged that the PGA Tour had taken actions damaging to the “careers and livelihoods of any golfers … who have the temerity to defy the Tour and play in tournaments sponsored by the new entrant.”[49] The complaint further alleged that the PGA Tour had taken such actions with the direct goal being to quash any competition or threat to the PGA Tour’s monopoly over the golf industry.[50] More specifically, plaintiffs in the case argued that the PGA Tour’s actions stood in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.[51]
D. A Merger is Announced
On June 6, 2023, the PGA Tour announced that they had entered a landmark agreement to unify men’s professional golf by merging the PGA Tour, the DP World Tour, and LIV.[52] The parties subsequently filed a motion to dismiss LIV’s antitrust lawsuit and the PGA Tour’s countersuit in connection with the announcement.[53] The proposed deal called for a new agreement to be completed by the end of 2023, outlining the specific terms of the merger between the two.[54] After the agreement, the U.S. Senate launched an investigation over concerns that it could give the Saudi government partial control over “a cherished American institution.”[55] The U.S. Department of Justice also began investigating the deal based upon suspicion that it could violate antitrust law, despite the lawsuit having already been dropped.[56]
The framework agreement initially stated the terms of the merger would be finalized by December 31, 2023, and the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund would subsequently pay a large sum of money to boost PGA Tour Enterprises.[57] The deadline passed without the announcement of any progress on the deal.[58] As of early 2025, it is unclear what direction the negotiations have taken, and there has not been a public announcement regarding a deadline.[59] However, President Trump recently became involved in the negotiations, holding talks with LIV Golf chairman Yasir Al-Rumayyan and PGA Tour commissioner Monahan.[60] The details of these meetings have not yet been released, leaving many to speculate regarding the impact that they may have.[61] President Trump has previously been a supporter of LIV Golf, and has made statements encouraging all golfers to accept the contracts offered by LIV to join the league.[62] Additionally, President Trump hosted six LIV events on his golf courses from 2022 to 2024, with more events planned for the future.[63] Regardless of President Trump’s potential success in brokering a deal, there is certainly still speculation that the underlying antitrust issues involved in the merger have slowed the process.[64]
E. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
Antitrust claims are generally governed by the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (“Sherman Act”).[65] The Sherman Act is a federal statute aimed at preventing monopolies, unreasonable restraints of trade, and other business practices that are deemed to be unfair or anticompetitive.[66] To successfully bring a Section 1 claim, as the LIV golfers did, a party must demonstrate that there was some type of concerted action on the part of the opposing party, aimed primarily at reducing competition within a given space.[67] Such concerted action could be present when a sports league sets various policies or regulations that reduce or limit competition within that particular sport, leading to antitrust claims.[68]
F. The Single-Entity Defense
Some sports leagues, like the NFL, have attempted to respond to Sherman Act Section 1 antitrust claims with what is known as the “single-entity defense.”[69] The single-entity defense is a legal argument made in response to antitrust claims where parties argue that they are a single entity, rather than competing entities.[70] This is important because a single entity cannot conspire with itself in an anti-competitive manner.[71] If entities are found to act as a single entity, then they cannot be found to have violated antitrust laws because they lack the concerted action necessary for such violations.[72]
The Supreme Court analyzed the single-entity defense in American Needle, Inc. v. NFL.[73] In this case, American Needle filed an action against the NFL alleging that the NFL, its teams, National Football League Properties (“NFLP”) and Reebok violated Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in their mutual agreements to make Reebok the exclusive provider of hats to NFL teams.[74] The NFL attempted to assert the single-entity defense, arguing that the formation of NFLP, an entity created to handle all intellectual property matters for the NFL, served as a single entity that promoted the common interests of the entire NFL.[75] The Court found that the NFL was not entitled to this defense in the American Needle case due to the competing economic interests of the various teams involved.[76] In general, team entities have not experienced great success in arguing this defense, though the different organizational structures of non-team entities could lead to a different outcome.[77]
III. Discussion
The LIV golfers may have been on the right track when they initially filed their antitrust claims against the PGA Tour. Many of the claims included in their complaint against the PGA Tour may still be valid in light of the proposed merger between the PGA Tour and LIV Golf. On the surface, the merger appears to be an attempt to unite two popular entities for the betterment of golf. However, the merger could ultimately create a monopoly within a competitive industry that poses a danger for entities that wish to compete within the sport.
A. Analysis of Single-Entity Defense
The PGA Tour and LIV Golf would be unlikely to succeed under the single-entity defense for substantially the same reasons outlined in American Needle.[78] The adversarial litigation engaged in between the parties before the merger negotiations illustrates the starkly different interests of each entity, as well as the thousands of golfers that fill their ranks.[79] These differing interests are further illustrated by LIV’s attempts to lure PGA Tour members into a business that directly competes with the PGA Tour.[80] Similar contrary interests prevented the NFL from being able to employ the use of the single-entity defense to Section 1 antitrust claims under the Sherman Act, and such contrary interests would likely prevent the PGA Tour and LIV Golf from utilizing it for the same reasons.[81]
B. Antitrust Analysis Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Courts generally utilize two key tests in analyzing Section 1 antitrust claims under the Sherman Act: a per se test and a rule of reason test.[82] Per se violations are presumed to be unreasonable because they place severe restrictions on competition within a given space while providing no benefit or value to the market.[83] Per se violations are typically very easy for a court to spot due to their egregious nature.[84] In more subtle cases where the per se rule does not apply, courts have adopted a rule of reason test which requires the complaining party to demonstrate the unreasonableness of a particular set of actions in an antitrust context.[85] The rule of reason test requires the plaintiff to establish: 1) a concerted action; 2) an injury; and 3) an anticompetitive effect on the market or power within the market.[86] Each of these tests are commonly used within sports antitrust cases to assess the compliance of a league’s conduct to antitrust laws.[87]
The proposed merger presents significant issues even though the antitrust lawsuit was dropped. The fact that the potential presence of antitrust violations is subject to debate leads to the conclusion that the rule of reason test is most appropriate to use. In 2023, the PGA Tour and LIV collectively announced efforts towards achieving a merger of the two entities in the face of disruption in the sport and litigation between the two entities over antitrust issues.[88] The merger would certainly satisfy the first prong of the rule of reason test, which requires the presence of concerted action.[89] In the present case, the PGA Tour and LIV Golf are working collectively to reach an agreement that would merge the two entities into one, likely for the purpose of avoiding legal issues of antitrust and settling frustrations among both fans and golfers. The third prong of the rule of reason test requires that there be an anticompetitive effect on the marker or power in the market.[90] If the proposed merger reestablishes the PGA’s prior monopoly, the anticompetitive effect appears clear, satisfying the third prong of the rule of reason test.
However, the second prong of the rule of reason test requires the plaintiff to prove some injury, which becomes tricky in a situation like this one.[91] A strong argument could be set forth that the potential merger of the PGA Tour and LIV directly injures any entity that wishes to enter the professional golf event industry by creating a monopoly that can easily quash competition within the space. LIV’s success in convincing some of the top golfers in the world to join their ranks shows the competitive nature of the golf industry when monopolies are strictly forbidden.[92] The professional golf industry is a space in which competition is possible and has the potential to thrive. By permitting mergers like this one to move forward in restoring a monopoly in the industry, there appears to be a clear harm to future market entrants. The harm to future market entrants is enough to satisfy the injury requirement of the second prong of the rule of reason test. Seeing as the three prongs of the Rule of Reason Test are met, it seems reasonable that the proposed merger between the PGA Tour and LIV Golf violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
C. Antitrust Analysis Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Additional antitrust violations may be present in the proposed merger under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 2 prohibits any attempts by a person or business “to monopolize, or attempting to monopolize, or combining or conspiring with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”[93] This provision essentially makes it impermissible for a person or entity to create or maintain a monopoly within a particular market.[94]
The PGA Tour and LIV Golf have made efforts to cease all legal battles with one another and have instead sought a merger agreement to create a single monopolistic powerhouse to limit competition within the professional golf industry.[95] Doing so presents a clear attempt to monopolize the commercial trade of professional golf events in an industry that has proven itself to be capable of competition, as exhibited by LIV’s entrance into the market.[96] As such, these actions represent the very behavior intended to be eradicated by Section 2 of the Sherman Act.[97] This means that the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) are likely to have a second avenue by which to nix the proposed merger.
D. Private Right of Action Under the Clayton Act of 1914
As previously noted, President Trump has been very involved with LIV, and his golf courses have a direct financial interest in LIV’s continued success.[98] Thus, the possibility exists that President Trump could instruct the DOJ and FTC to refrain from enforcing antitrust laws against the potential merger. If this occurs, a private right of action is available under the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (“Clayton Act”).[99] The Clayton Act provides that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property because of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States ….”[100] This means that any person or entity that wishes to conduct business in the golf industry that may be harmed by the monopolistic effects of the potential PGA Tour – LIV Golf merger could bring a private antitrust action under the Clayton Act. In addition, a successful claim under the Clayton Act allows the plaintiff to recover treble damages.[101] Even if President Trump decides to limit the ability of the DOJ and FTC to pursue antitrust claims against the proposed merger, private individuals and entities will still have a remedy to oppose the merger under the Clayton Act.
IV. Conclusion
Ultimately, the proposed merger between the PGA Tour and LIV Golf presents the same types of antitrust issues that were originally brought to the court system by LIV golfers when they first filed their lawsuit against the PGA Tour in 2022.[102] Rather than continuing to foster the high degree of competition that has existed in the golf industry between the PGA Tour and LIV since LIV first emerged, the proposed merger seeks to place control of an entire market back into the hands of a monopolistic entity, stifling the type of competition that provides excitement and entertainment within most sports industries. As a result, it is unlikely that we will see a finalized merger executed between the PGA Tour and LIV Golf in the future, at least not one originally structured in their framework agreement. Any attempts to do so would likely subject the deal to significant antitrust violations, therefore preventing the implementation of such a merger.
[1] Chris Deubert, PGA Decision on LIV Golfers May Lie in Antitrust Law, Not Magnanimity, Forbes (Sept. 20, 2024), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisdeubert/2024/09/20/pga-decision-on-liv-golfers-may-lie-in-antitrust-law-not-magnanimity/ [https://perma.cc/F97Q-TJEH].
[2] Owen Poindexter, Seven of 10 Highest Paid Golfers Joined LIV Golf, Front Off. Sports (June 13, 2024), https://frontofficesports.com/seven-of-10-highest-paid-golfers-joined-liv-golf/ [https://perma.cc/ZK3C-3FVK].
[3] Mark McCareins, Will the PGA-LIV Golf Merger Pass the Antitrust Test?, KelloggInsight (July 1, 2023), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/pga-liv-golf-merger-antitrust [https://perma.cc/F8BU-MX98].
[4] Deubert, supra note 1.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] McCareins, supra note 3.
[9] Id.
[10] Bob Harig, How We Got Here: A Timeline of LIV Golf and How the PGA Tour Eventually Embraced Its Rival, Sports Illustrated (Mar. 12, 2024), https://www.si.com/golf/news/timeline-liv-golf-how-pga-tour-adapted#:~:text=the%20outside%20threat.-,2021:%20LIV%20Golf%20is%20born,was%20going%20to%20the%20players [https://perma.cc/U7RR-62AJ].
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Fergus Bisset, 9 Ways LIV Golf is Different to The PGA Tour, Golf Monthly (Feb. 2, 2023), https://www.golfmonthly.com/features/9-ways-liv-golf-is-different-to-the-pga-tour [https://perma.cc/CC6Y-48MY].
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Edward Sutelan, LIV Golf Rules, Explained: The Biggest Differences vs. PGA Tour Include Shorter Rounds, Teams & Shotgun Starts, The Sporting News (Sept. 2, 2022), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/golf/news/liv-golf-rules-pga-tour/iywjdfqirerdej1hzcg0vd6c [https://perma.cc/2BPF-2X5L].
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Bisset, supra note 13.
[26] Id.
[27] Paul Kasabian, Greg Norman: ‘I’d Win the Debate’ vs. Tiger Woods, Rory McIlroy on LIV Golf Benefits, Bleacher Report (Jan. 21, 2025), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/10151651-greg-norman-id-win-the-debate-vs-tiger-woods-rory-mcilroy-on-liv-golf-benefits [https://perma.cc/4PYJ-XKSA].
[28] Id.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Emily Washburn, PGA Takes on Liv Golf’s Saudi Backers: Everything You Need to Know About Golf’s Messiest Controversy, Forbes (Feb. 23, 2023), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilywashburn/2023/02/23/pga-takes-on-liv-golfs-saudi-backers-everything-you-need-to-know-about-golfs-messiest-controversy/#:~:text=LIV%20and%20the%20PGA%20have,Crucial%20Quote [https://perma.cc/Y9L9-T2TX].
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Ben Fleming, From ‘Dead In The Water’ to ‘Let The Come Back’ – What Rory McIlroy Has Said About LIV Golf Since The Rival Tour’s Inception, Golf Monthly (Feb. 9, 2024), https://www.golfmonthly.com/news/from-dead-in-the-water-to-let-them-come-back-what-rory-mcilroy-has-said-about-liv-golf-since-the-rival-tours-inception [https://perma.cc/6GPY-4YU9].
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Deubert, supra note 1.
[42] Id.
[43] Homero De la Fuente, PGA Tour Officially Suspends Golfers Participating in Inaugural LIV Golf Event, CNN Sports (June 9, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/09/sport/pga-tour-liv-golf-series-spt-intl/index.html#:~:text=Following%20the%20start%20of%20the,participate%20in%20PGA%20Tour%20tournaments. [https://perma.cc/AJE7-QF8Q].
[44] Id.
[45] Jack Lumb, Why are LIV Golfers Allowed to Play in the DP World Tour?, Golf Today (Oct. 7, 2024), https://golftoday.co.uk/why-are-liv-golfers-allowed-to-play-in-dp-world-tour-events/ [https://perma.cc/5YNH-PE3H].
[46] De la Fuente, supra note 43.
[47] Homero De la Fuente and Jacob Lev, Phil Mickelson, 10 Other LIV Golfers File Antitrust Lawsuit Against PGA Tour, CNN Sports (Aug. 3, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/03/golf/liv-golfers-sue-pga-tour-spt-intl/index.html#:~:text=The%20lawsuit%20plaintiffs%20also%20include,Jason%20Kokrak%20and%20Peter%20Uihlein. [https://perma.cc/T9UL-K4SA].
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Mickelson v. PGA Tour, Inc., No. 22-cv-04486-BLF, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142803, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2022).
[52] Riley Hamel, A Complete Timeline of LIV Golf, leading up to PGA Tour Merger, Golfweek (June 6, 2023), https://golfweek.usatoday.com/lists/liv-golf-history-pga-tour-merger/ [https://perma.cc/LX3U-LVDZ].
[53] Joel Beall, PGA Tour, LIV Golf Formally Drop Antitrust Lawsuits, Ending Year of Legal Battle, GolfDigest (June 16, 2023), https://www.golfdigest.com/story/pga-tour-liv-golf-lawsuits-dropped-2023.
[54] Id.
[55] Id.
[56] Id.
[57] Tom D’Angelo, A Year After LIV Golf – PGA Tour ‘Framework’ Shocked the World Here’s a Timeline of What’s Happened, Golfweek (May 31, 2024), https://golfweek.usatoday.com/story/sports/golf/2024/05/31/liv-golf-pga-tour-framework-agreement-timeline-one-year/73921153007/ [https://perma.cc/UQL3-X5EK].
[58] Id.
[59] Id.
[60] Kieran O’Connor, President Donald Trump Continues to Push for PGA-LIV Golf Merger, Insider Sports (Feb. 21, 2025), https://insidersport.com/2025/02/21/president-donald-trump-pga-liv-golf/.
[61] Id.
[62] Derek Saul, LIV Golf Scores TV Deal with Fox Sports – As Trump-Linked, Saudi-Backed League Goes Mainstream, Forbes (Jan. 16, 2025), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2025/01/16/liv-golf-scores-tv-deal-with-fox-sports-as-trump-linked-saudi-backed-league-goes-mainstream/ [https://perma.cc/7EHX-E4FG].
[63] Id.
[64] Deubert, supra note 1.
[65] See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2.
[66] Id.
[67] Robert S. Jeffrey, Beyond the Hype: The Legal and Practical Consequences of American Needle, 11 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 667, 670–71 (2010).
[68] Id.
[69] Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 197–98 (2010).
[70] Id. at 194.
[71] Id.
[72] Id.
[73] Id. at 197-98.
[74] Id. at 187.
[75] Id. at 197-98.
[76] Id. at 200-01.
[77] See Cyntrice Thomas et al., The Treatment of Non-Team Sports Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 12 VA. Sports & Ent. L.J. 296, 307–09 (2013).
[78] Am Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 197–98.
[79] Deubert, supra note 1.
[80] Id.
[81] Am Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 197-98.
[82] Ralph Gerstein & Lois Gerstein, Prosecution or Defense of Antitrust Actions Relating to College or Professional Sports, 117 Am. Jur. Proof Of Facts 3d 391 § 11 (Thomson Reuters) (2010).
[83]Antitrust Standards of Review: The Per Se, Rule of Reason, and Quick Look Tests, Bonalaw (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.bonalaw.com/insights/legal-resources/antitrust-standards-of-review-the-per-se-rule-of-reason-and-quick-look-tests [https://perma.cc/7KXA-GGMQ].
[84] Id.
[85] Id.
[86] Gerstein, supra note 82.
[87] Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 573, 589–91 (2015).
[88] McCareins, supra note 3.
[89] Gerstein, supra note 82.
[90] Id.
[91] Id.
[92] Deubert, supra note 1.
[93] 15 U.S.C. § 2.
[94] Id.
[95] McCareins, supra note 3.
[96] Id.
[97] See 15 U.S.C. § 2.
[98] Saul, supra note 62.
[99] See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
[100] 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
[101] Id.
[102] De la Fuente and Lev, supra note 47.
Cover Photo by Courtney Cook on Unsplash.
